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STOCK-MARKET LAW AND THE 
ACCURACY OF PUBLIC COMPANIES’ 
STOCK PRICES  
Kevin Haeberle 
The social benefits of more accurate stock prices—that is, 
stock-market prices that more accurately reflect the future 
cash flows that companies are likely to produce—are well 
established. But it is also thought that market forces alone 
will lead to only a sub-optimal level of stock-price accuracy—
a level that fails to obtain the maximum net social benefits, or 
wealth, that would result from a higher level. One of the 
principal aims of federal securities law has therefore been to 
increase the extent to which the stock prices of the most 
important companies in our economy (public companies) 
contain information about firms’ prospects so that society 
generates more wealth. Indeed, enhancing the accuracy of 
these prices in this way is perhaps the primary justification 
for the corporate disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading rules 
that make up the traditional core of federal securities law. 
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Yet, important price-accuracy effects of a distinct area of the 
field (the law governing the market in which stocks are 
traded) have been overlooked. 
This Article theorizes that a set of central, yet little-
noticed, stock-market rules is resulting in society producing a 
lower level of stock-price accuracy than it otherwise might. 
The Article therefore provides examples of ways in which the 
laws governing stock trading can be altered to increase stock-
price accuracy. And it urges regulators to consider whether 
such alternations might be socially desirable in one of two 
ways: by enhancing the current level of stock-price accuracy 
in a manner that results in net social benefits, or by providing 
society with a lower-cost means than those associated with 
existing disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws for 
obtaining that current level. Accordingly, the Article theorizes 
that regulators have a fourth main securities-law tool (stock-
market law) for increasing the accuracy of public companies’ 
stock prices, and sets forth a cost-benefit framework to help 
them determine whether it can be used to achieve one of the 
chief goals of securities law: obtaining a socially optimal level 
of stock-price accuracy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and lawmakers have long touted the social 
benefits of public-company stock prices that more accurately 
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reflect the future cash flows that those companies are likely 
to produce. This type of enhanced stock-price accuracy, they 
assert, aids society by leading to improved capital allocation 
and corporate governance. But those who impound 
information about firms’ prospects into stock prices are 
unable to capture the full amount of these social benefits 
that result from their efforts. This inability, in turn, leaves 
the vast beneficiaries of better resource allocation and firm 
management on their own to band together in a collective 
effort to make stock prices more accurate—something they 
cannot efficiently do. For these reasons, market forces alone 
are thought to lead only to a suboptimal level of stock-price 
accuracy—that is, a level that fails to obtain net social 
benefits, or welfare, that would result from a higher level. 
One of the principal aims of securities law is therefore to get 
more information about firms’ prospects into stocks’ market 
prices so that society generates more wealth. However, work 
in this area has overwhelmingly focused on the corporate 
disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws that compose the 
core of a typical Securities Regulation class. And important 
price-accuracy effects of a distinct area of the field (the law 
governing the market in which stocks are traded) have gone 
unnoticed. 
This Article theorizes that a set of central stock-market 
rules to which no one seems to have paid much attention is 
resulting in society producing a lower level of stock-price 
accuracy than it otherwise might—and therefore quite 
plausibly generating less wealth than it otherwise might. 
The set of rules at issue is composed of what I refer to as the 
trading-platform access rules: the federal securities laws 
that requires stock exchanges to remain open to all traders,1 
but that allows off-exchange trading platforms to select 
 
1 See Regulation National Market System Rule 610(a), 17 C.F.R. § 
242.610(a) (2005) (prohibiting “national securities exchange[s] [from] . . . 
prevent[ing] or inhibit[ing] any person from obtaining efficient access” to 
the offers to buy and sell stocks that are posted on their trading systems); 
Securities and Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1934) (providing that a 
registered exchange must allow “any registered broker or dealer . . . [to] 
become a member of [its] exchange”). 
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which traders can and cannot access their trading systems.2 
In the end, I show that an examination of these rules and 
their far-reaching effects leads to the conclusion that 
lawmakers can modify stock-market law to increase stock-
price accuracy. And I therefore urge lawmakers to consider 
whether such legal modifications could be used to increase 
social welfare in one of two ways: by enhancing the current 
level of stock-price accuracy in a manner that results in net 
social benefits, or by providing society with a lower-cost 
means than the existing core of securities law for obtaining 
that current level. Accordingly, the Article theorizes that 
regulators have a fourth main securities-law tool (stock-
market law) for increasing the accuracy of public companies’ 
stock prices, and offers them a cost-benefit framework to 
help them determine whether this tool can be used to 
achieve one of the chief aims of securities law: obtaining a 
welfare-maximizing level of stock-price accuracy. 
Given the social benefits of enhanced stock-price accuracy 
and the concern that market forces without legal 
intervention will fail to produce accurate stock prices at an 
optimal level, it should come as little surprise that much of 
securities law attempts to facilitate the generation of 
information about firms’ prospects and the price-correcting 
work of informed traders.3 Informed traders—such as some 
sophisticated banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, and 
actively managed mutual funds—are those that buy and sell 
stocks based on superior information about companies’ 
 
2 See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading System Rule 
301(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5) (1997); Concept Release on Equity 
Market Structure, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 17 
C.F.R. § 242, at 72 (“As [trading systems] that are exempt from exchange 
registration, [off-exchange platforms] are not required to provide fair 
access [to all traders] unless they reach a 5% trading volume threshold in 
a stock, which none currently do[es]” and that “[a]s a result, access to . . . 
[these platforms] . . . is determined primarily by private negotiation.”). 
3 See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role 
of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 715 (2006) (asserting that the 
essential role of “securities regulation is . . . to facilitate and protect the 
work of inform[ed] traders” that leads to the production of more 
information about firms’ values). 
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values. These traders seek to profit by producing (or 
procuring) such information, and then using it to buy 
underpriced stocks and sell overpriced ones. As a byproduct 
of this profit-motivated trading, they generate (or pay others 
to generate) this information. And this information 
ultimately results in stock prices that more accurately 
predict the future cash flows that firms will produce as well 
as the social benefits that flow from those more informative 
prices. 
Indeed, aiding informed traders and this process in which 
more information about companies’ prospects is produced 
and incorporated into their stocks’ market prices is perhaps 
the principal justification for the costly rules that compose 
the three-pronged traditional core of federal securities 
regulation.4 Rules that require firms to disclose internal 
information about their businesses mandate the provision of 
that information to the public, thereby ensuring the 
production and dissemination of important information that 
informed traders use to price stocks more accurately.5 Laws 
that prohibit fraud help increase the truthfulness and 
integrity of such corporate disclosures, thereby making sure 
that this key information is accurate and enabling informed 
traders to rely on it when pricing stocks. And even the 
general prohibition on insider trading is thought by many to 
foster investment in the production of this valuable 
information by those informed traders who are best situated 
to accurately evaluate stock prices (professional outside 
informed traders) because the proscription increases the 
likelihood that these traders can use this information to 
 
4 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of 
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (noting that this 
“vast legal framework” is motivated “by one principal goal of securities 
laws: . . . creat[ing] stock markets in which the market price of a stock 
corresponds to its fundamental value.”). 
5 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and 
Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 342–44 
(2003). 
  
No. 1:121] STOCK-PRICE ACCURACY 127 
profit because it protects them from being undercut and 
mislead by corporate insiders and their tippees.6 
Yet, as a matter of theory, central aspects of the federal 
securities laws that regulate how stocks are traded affect 
both informed traders and the incentive to produce 
information about firms’ prospects in a very different way. 
The theory proceeds as follows. The trading-platform access 
rules allow off-exchange platforms—through which an 
enormous portion of overall trading now occurs—to choose 
which traders can and cannot access their trading systems. 
These platforms use this power to target uninformed traders 
(such as individual retail-level investors and index-driven 
mutual funds) and exclude informed ones. This legal ability 
to discriminate among traders also often results in informed 
traders, as a practical matter, preferring to complete much of 
their trading through exchanges. In practice, then, these 
trading rules lead off-exchange platforms to be dominated by 
uninformed traders—and, critically, open exchanges to 
therefore have a far higher ratio of informed traders to 
uninformed ones. As a result, other traders on exchanges 
fear that they will be trading opposite informed traders, and 
that these informed traders will use superior information to 
profit at their expense. Well-established literature in the 
market-microstructure area of economics7 shows that these 
other traders respond to this type of situation by providing 
all of their counterparties with prices that are both inferior 
and, crucially, more sensitive to trading activity. Facing 
these inferior and more reactive prices, informed traders—
who, often unable to access off-exchange platforms and 
preferring to transact via exchanges, are to a significant 
extent relegated to exchanges—have fewer profitable trading 
 
6 See generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider 
Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 1229 (2001). 
7 Market microstructure is a branch of economics focused on the 
forces at play between buyers and sellers in markets. For a seminal 
treatise on market microstructure authored by a former chief economist of 
the SEC aimed at a broad audience, see LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & 
EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 6 (2003). 
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opportunities. Thus, their motivation to produce (or pay 
others to produce) information about firms’ prospects and 
impound it into market prices is weaker, and public 
companies’ stock prices are consequently less informative. 
The law should be able to address these previously 
unidentified effects that trading rules are now having on the 
accuracy of stock prices. For example, a mandate that all 
trading take place through exchanges would give traders on 
exchanges comfort that they will face a lower ratio of 
informed traders to uninformed ones. That lower ratio 
would, in turn, lead them to provide all of their 
counterparties on exchanges with prices that are both 
superior and less sensitive to trading activity—thereby 
increasing the incentive to produce information about stocks’ 
values and impound it into market prices. Alternatively, 
changing stock-market law to impose fees on public firms to 
subsidize trading in their stocks on exchanges would also 
likely result in informed traders facing superior and less 
reactive prices, and therefore accomplish the same end 
without requiring a restructuring of the stock market. Thus, 
it is likely that stock-market law can be reformed to make 
public companies’ stock prices more accurately reflect the 
future cash flows that they will produce—that is, to improve 
stock-price accuracy. 
To be sure, society may already be producing a high 
enough level of stock-price accuracy. A large portion of 
existing securities law, once again, already targets the 
under-production of information about firms’ prospects. 
Moreover, from at least a political perspective, further legal 
support of sophisticated banks, hedge funds, private equity 
funds, and actively managed mutual funds may be 
unappealing—even if the ultimate goal of that support is the 
production of valuable information and not the wellbeing of 
these market participants. As such, to the extent that 
altering stock-market law to make prices more accurate fails 
to generate additional social benefits that exceed the 
additional social costs necessary to achieve them, these 
alterations certainly should not be added on top of the 
current extensive regulatory regime aimed at bolstering 
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stock-price accuracy. Nevertheless, using stock-market law 
to improve the accuracy of stock prices may still be desirable 
because it—along with adaptations to disclosure, fraud, and 
insider-trading laws—may enable society to achieve its 
current level of stock-price accuracy at a lower cost than the 
one associated with those burdensome rules that make up 
the bulk of existing securities law. Accordingly, as a matter 
of theory, regulators have a fourth securities-law tool that 
they can use to increase the accuracy of public companies’ 
stock prices. And they should therefore consider whether this 
novel tool can be used to achieve what is perhaps the chief 
aim of the field: obtaining the level of stock-price accuracy 
that generates the most wealth. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II 
provides a brief overview of the concept of accurate stock 
prices, the process in which they are produced, and their 
main social benefits. Part III then describes how stocks are 
traded today, focusing on three basic types of market 
participants that trade stocks as well as the two broad types 
of platforms through which they trade them. Part IV 
explores how the trading-platform access rules theoretically 
affect this trading and, in turn, stock-price accuracy and its 
main social benefits—concluding by offering changes to 
stock-market law that would likely improve stock-price 
accuracy in a material manner. Lastly, in light of these new 
ideas, Part V urges regulators to consider whether such 
accuracy-enhancing changes to stock-market law could be 
used to help society achieve the level of stock-price accuracy 
that maximizes social welfare—and provides them with a 
cost-benefit framework to help them make that 
determination. 
II. STOCK-PRICE ACCURACY AND ITS MAIN 
SOCIAL BENEFITS 
Companies have values that are based on the future cash 
flows that they are likely to produce, and the market prices 
of their stocks therefore reflect those values with varying 
degrees of accuracy. These market prices are thought to 
become more accurate when informed traders generate and 
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use information about firms’ prospects to purchase 
underpriced stocks or sell overpriced ones. Scholars have 
encouraged lawmakers to respect this informed-trader work 
because when stock prices better reflect their values, they 
contend, corporations are better governed and capital is more 
efficiently allocated—thereby improving the functioning of 
the economy in a manner that creates more wealth for 
society. 
Section A provides background on stock-price accuracy—
namely, background on what it means to say that a stock’s 
market price accurately reflects its value. It also describes 
the process in which information about stocks’ values is 
produced and incorporated into market prices—thereby 
making them more accurate in this way. Section B then 
offers an overview of the main social benefits that are 
thought to result from higher levels of stock-price accuracy. 
A. Stock-Price Accuracy 
Despite common conceptions, stocks can be said to have 
very real values. Stock-market prices reflect those values 
with different degrees of accuracy. When more information 
about the future cash flows that firms are likely to produce is 
generated and impounded into these prices, they are 
understood to be more accurate in this way. 
1. The Concept of Accurate Stock Prices 
Stocks are said to have fundamental values: the present 
value of the future cash flows that their holders will receive.8 
For example, imagine a holder of a share of stock who will 
 
8  See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 4, at 979 n.11 (defining a stock’s 
fundamental value as “the best estimate at any time, and given all 
information available at such time, of the discounted value of all 
distributions . . . accruing to a stockholder who continues to hold the 
stock.”). Indeed, stocks can even be thought of as ultimately having actual 
values based on the actual amounts that their holders end up receiving. 
See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and 
Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 
1013–14 (1984). 
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own that share over the stock’s lifetime. And further imagine 
that the best information available today indicates that he 
will eventually receive a total of three payments of $3.33 in 
the form of a mix of dividend and liquidation distributions. 
In this example, without considering the time value of money 
and the risk associated with varying future cash flows, the 
stock’s fundamental value is $10 per share. Thus, if someone 
offered you a choice between a certificate for a share of that 
stock and 9 one-dollar bills today, you would choose the 
certificate—and if someone offered you a choice between that 
certificate and 11 one-dollar bills, you would choose the bills. 
Stocks’ market prices reflect these fundamental values to 
varying degrees. When those prices are closer to 
fundamental values, they are said to have a higher degree of 
accuracy. Conversely, when they are farther from those 
values, they are said to have a lower degree of accuracy. For 
example, if the market’s assessment of the stock’s value from 
the above example was $10 per share today, it would be 
accurately priced. If it was instead $11 per share, it would be 
inaccurately priced—and if it was instead $12 per share, it 
would be even more inaccurately priced. 
Notably, stock prices are inherently susceptible to 
inaccuracy. Ex ante, humans can only imperfectly estimate 
the amount of cash flows to which an owner of stock will be 
entitled in the future, the timing of those cash flows, the 
risks associated with them, and more. In fact, these cash 
flows and risks may differ greatly depending, for example, on 
whether the company in the end remains in the hands of 
existing management as opposed to an acquirer such as 
Warren Buffett. Nevertheless, more and better information 
about such determinants of the cash flows that the holder of 
a stock will receive in the future provides a clearer—if 
imperfect—measures of a stock’s value. Thus, the degree to 
which market prices provide accurate assessments of stocks’ 
fundamental values (i.e. the level of stock-price accuracy) is a 
function of the amount and quality of information about the 
likely future cash flows associated with ownership of stocks 
that is produced and incorporated into their market prices. 
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2. The Production of Accurate Stock Prices 
The production of accurate stock prices is commonly 
thought to depend on—among other things—the amount and 
quality of information about firms’ prospects that is 
generated by informed traders and their affiliates. Informed 
traders—such as some investment banks, hedge funds, 
private equity funds, and actively managed mutual funds—
are those that buy and sell stocks based on information as to 
the likely future cash flows that their owners will receive 
that is not yet incorporated into their market prices.9 These 
market participants are incentivized to produce more and 
better information about these likely cash flows because they 
are often able to use it to earn trading profits. More 
specifically, they are motivated to produce information that 
indicates that the market has inaccurately priced a stock 
because they can use that information to buy stocks that are 
priced inaccurately low or sell stocks that are priced 
inaccurately high.10 And when they use their information to 
buy an underpriced stock or sell an overpriced one in 
sufficient quantities, they place enough upward or downward 
pressure, respectively, on its market price to cause that price 
to better reflect their information—and therefore to better 
reflect the stock’s fundamental value.11 Thus, stock prices 
become increasingly accurate as a byproduct of informed 
traders’ profit-motivated trading. 
It is important to note that informed traders will only 
invest in the production of information about stocks’ values if 
they expect to earn revenues that exceed the costs associated 
with procuring the information and more. Generally, the 
main source of revenue for informed traders comes in the 
form of trading profits. As such, the more revenue these 
 
9 See generally infra Part III.A.1. 
10 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 726 (“[Informed] 
traders detect discrepancies between value and [market] price based on 
the information they possess. They then trade to capture the value of their 
informational advantage.”). 
11 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 6 (“[Informed] [t]raders . . . estimate 
fundamental values [and] cause prices to reflect their value estimates.”). 
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traders expect to earn from profitable trades, the stronger 
their incentive to produce fundamental-value information 
and impound it into market prices. Conversely, the less such 
revenue they expect to garner, the weaker that information 
production-and-incorporation incentive. Accordingly, the 
extent to which stock prices will be accurate—that is, the 
extent to which more and better information about firms’ 
prospects is produced and incorporated into market prices—
is significantly driven by the amount of trading profits that 
informed traders expect to realize. 
B. The Main Social Benefits of Accurate Stock Prices12 
For some time, scholars and lawmakers alike have 
contended that two main social benefits result when stocks’ 
market prices are closer to their values: corporations are 
better governed, and capital is better allocated.13 
1. Corporate Governance 
Conventional economic theory asserts that society obtains 
more wealth when publicly traded corporations maximize 
their own values. (This assertion assumes, among other 
things, that externalities such as pollution are controlled.) 
Economists reason as follows: Firms generally maximize 
their values when they maximize their profits; firms’ 
revenues are a measure of the benefits they add to society; 
firms’ costs are an indicator of the resources they take away 
from society; and finally, firms’ profits (i.e., their revenues 
minus their costs) therefore serve as a loose proxy for the net 
 
12 Although I focus on the two main social benefits of accurate stock 
prices, more accurate pricing likely also leads to other important social 
benefits. For example, investors will discount the amount they are willing 
to pay in return for a company’s stock if it is likely to be inaccurately 
priced. Those discounts harm society by increasing the cost of capital for 
firms. The existence of this common discounting practice dictates that 
higher levels of stock-price accuracy would, at a minimum, reduce the 
magnitude of such discounts and therefore benefit society. 
13 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 1013–14 (discussing the social 
benefits of enhanced stock-price accuracy). 
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utility gains that they provide to society. Accordingly, 
members of society want corporations to maximize their own 
values so that society has more wealth—wealth that it may 
ultimately distribute as it sees fit. 
Shareholders also want the firms they own to maximize 
their own values. Indeed, firm value maximization, which 
maximizes shareholder investment returns, is generally the 
only goal on which the long line of diverse shareholders of 
publicly traded companies can find common ground.14 
However, for the overwhelming majority of public firms, the 
main decisions that determine whether or not the company 
will in fact maximize its profits fall not within the domain of 
society or shareholders, but within that of corporate 
managers—agents whose interests often diverge from those 
of their principals. As a result of this conflict, both society 
and shareholders suffer wealth losses in the form of well-
known corporate agency costs—costs that arise out of agent 
managers failing to diligently and loyally further the social 
and shareholder-owner goal of maximizing firm values.15 
Reducing these agency costs is one of the principal aims 
of corporate law.16 Toward that end, corporate law has 
generated a wide range of agency-cost-reducing governance 
devices—including traditional ones relating to board 
supervision, shareholder voting, and manager fiduciary 
duties. The supervision of corporate officers by a centralized 
board with independent directors—which is required by 
SEC-approved exchange requirements for publicly traded 
 
14 RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 7 (11th ed. 2013) (noting that 
shareholders “differ in age, tastes, wealth, time horizon, risk tolerance, 
and investment strategy” but that they can all agree on the financial 
objective of “[m]aximiz[ing] the current market value of [their] investment 
in the firm.”). 
15 See, e.g., ADOLF BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (providing the seminal 
articulation of the agency problem that flows from the separation of 
ownership from control in publicly traded corporations). 
16 See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN 
SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 12–13 (3d ed. 2009). 
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companies—is widely thought to reduce these costs by 
ensuring that a small group of individuals that contains 
outside supervisors can better monitor (and increase) the 
extent to which firm insiders are maximizing profits on 
shareholders’ behalf.17 The shareholder right to vote in the 
election of directors and a variety of other key company 
decisions—a franchise that is conferred by state corporate 
law—aims to decrease agency costs by ensuring firm owners 
will have some degree of control over the extent to which 
managers maximize value. Lastly, fiduciary duties—also 
instituted by state corporate law—are imposed on both 
directors and officers in an effort to reduce agency costs by 
legally obligating these economic agents to work with both 
care for, and fidelity to, their principals and their interest in 
value maximization. 
Corporate law has also facilitated the reduction of agency 
costs via more recent governance devices, including 
blockholder activism and stock compensation. Blockholder 
activism—that is, the situation in which investors acquire 
significant blocks of a company’s stock so that they have both 
the economic incentive and the power to influence corporate 
management—takes place within a highly regulated legal 
framework. Although not without controversy, such activism 
is generally assumed to reduce agency costs because 
blockholders—large shareholders whose profit margins 
increase when the profit margins of the firms they target 
increase—are financially incentivized to take actions to reign 
in managerial slack.18 Stock compensation—that is, pay for 
managers in the form of company stock and related forms 
rather than cash—has also been highly influenced by the 
law. This form of compensation, it is argued, reduces agency 
costs because with their fortunes tied to those of owners of 
the enterprise and society, managers are encouraged to 
 
17 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (citing 
Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983)). 
18 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law 
and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 40 (Spring 
2012) (asserting that unlike smaller dispersed shareholders, blockholders 
are incentivized to invest in managerial monitoring and engagement). 
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prioritize firm value maximization over competing personal 
goals.19 
However, there is a consensus that the effectiveness of all 
of these governance devices depends on the extent to which 
stock prices are accurate. For the boards and shareholders 
that wield these devices, more accurate stock prices—that is, 
prices that contain more information about firms’ likely 
future cash flows—are believed to better communicate the 
extent to which management is in fact maximizing firm 
profits.20 For this reason, scholars teach that when boards 
and shareholders can rely on these prices for such 
information, they can better use the traditional tools that 
corporate law provides for reducing agency costs. For 
example, stock prices that are accurately high relative to a 
firm’s book value or relative to the stock prices of similarly 
situated firms communicate to boards and shareholders that 
management is better maximizing firm value, while prices 
that are accurately low relative to these measures signal the 
opposite. Furthermore, higher levels of stock-price accuracy 
also improve the functioning of the newer corporate-
governance tools of blockholder activism and stock-based 
compensation. For example, when stocks’ prices better reflect 
their fundamental values, managers place a higher value on 
company stock, thereby reducing agency costs by allowing 
firms to compensate managers with interest-aligning stock 
in lieu of straight salary. More specifically, enhanced stock-
price accuracy allows companies to compensate managers in 
this form without having to pay excessive premiums to get 
the managers to accept payment in this riskier form.21 Thus, 
 
19 See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal 
and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979); Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308–10 (1976). 
20 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 7, at 211 (“Informative stock prices 
provide shareholders with useful information about how well their 
managers are performing.”). 
21 See Fox, supra note 8, at 1022 (“The higher the expected accuracy 
of a firm’s share price, [the less risk it poses to a manager, and therefore] 
the more willing a manager will be for a large portion of his compensation 
package to be share price based.”). 
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when public companies’ stocks are more accurately priced, 
boards and shareholders are widely thought to be better able 
to use a variety of corporate-governance devices to reduce 
agency costs—thereby leading society to produce more 
wealth. 
2. Capital Allocation 
Conventional economic theory also holds that society 
generates more wealth when it allocates its scarce capital in 
an economically efficient manner—that is, when it allocates 
a larger amount of capital to more promising endeavors and 
a smaller amount to less promising ones. Scholars assert 
that when stocks’ market prices more accurately reflect the 
the cash flows to which their holders will likely be entitled, 
firms with superior projects are able to access more of 
society’s capital, and those with inferior ones are only able to 
access less of it. When stocks’ market prices are accurate, 
these scholars reason, companies with larger expected profits 
have—all else equal—higher stock prices than those with 
smaller expected profits. As a result, they have a lower cost 
of capital because, for example, they can sell a given portion 
of their company in exchange for a larger amount of money. 
They therefore are able to access more capital to pursue their 
superior projects. Likewise, when stocks’ market prices are 
accurate, firms with smaller expected profits have—all else 
equal—lower prices than those with superior ones. As a 
result, they have a higher cost of capital because, for 
example, they are only able to trade ownership rights to a 
given portion of their company for a smaller amount of 
money. As a result, they are only able to access less of 
society’s capital to pursue those inferior projects. 
Accordingly, when stock prices are accurate, firms with 
superior prospects—that is, those with higher values—will 
generally draw more capital and firms with inferior ones—
that is, those with smaller expected future cash flows—will 
draw less.22 
 
22 See Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. 
ECON. REV. 519, 519–20 (1945); see also Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra 
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Of course, these scholars also assert that the reverse is 
true when stocks’ market prices are less accurate. Stock 
prices that do not accurately reflect firms’ values can lead 
companies with superior prospects to nevertheless have 
difficulty raising enough capital to pursue their projects and 
the associated superior returns. They can also allow those 
with inferior projects to raise more capital than society 
should allocate to their projects and the associated inferior 
returns. Accordingly, these scholars teach that inaccurate 
stock prices lead society to allocate capital less efficiently 
than it would if those prices more precisely reflected 
fundamental values.23 
Finally, there is another way in which higher stock-price 
accuracy is thought to increase—and lower stock-price 
accuracy is thought to decrease—the extent to which society 
allocates its capital efficiently. Today, the predominant 
source of funds for new investment in the economy is 
internally generated firm capital, and the biggest 
consequence of poor corporate governance is the misuse of 
this capital. When stock prices are accurate, boards and 
shareholders are better able to use the corporate-governance 
tools discussed in the immediately preceding Subsection to 
limit the extent to which managers misuse these funds. So, 
the corporate-governance benefits of enhanced stock-price 
accuracy are also thought to improve the efficiency with 
which society allocates its scarce capital. 
This initial background Part has recited consensus views 
relating to stock-price accuracy and its main social benefits. 
These broadly accepted understandings motivate a large 
amount of law and commentary on the corporate disclosure, 
fraud, and insider-trading laws that make up the lion’s share 
of securities law today. However, those three main areas of 
securities law primarily center on the firms that issue stock. 
And the ability of regulators to improve stock-price accuracy 
 
note 3, at 720 (“Accurate pricing is essential for achieving efficient 
allocation of resources in the economy.”). 
23 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 1016 (“If the market prices of 
securities are inaccurate, a misallocation of resources for real investment 
can occur.”). 
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in a manner that would enhance firm governance and capital 
allocation by altering stock-market law has gone undetected. 
In building to the conclusion that it is likely that regulators 
can materially improve stock-price accuracy by reforming 
central aspects of stock-market law, the next Part provides 
essential background on how stocks are traded today. 
III. CONTEMPORARY STOCK TRADING 
At its core, contemporary stock trading involves the 
market participants who trade stocks and the platforms 
through which they complete almost all of their trading. The 
former are composed of the individuals and institutions that 
buy and sell public companies’ stocks based on a wide 
spectrum of motivations. The latter are made up of two types 
of highly sophisticated electronic trading systems: exchange 
platforms and off-exchange platforms. 
Section A describes the universe of stock traders. Section 
B then details the platforms through which they buy and sell 
stocks. 
A. Stock Traders 
The market participants that buy and sell stocks in the 
contemporary stock market can be broken down into three 
broad types: informed traders, uninformed traders, and 
professional liquidity-providing traders.24 
1. Informed Traders 
Informed traders are those who purchase and sell stocks 
based on information as to companies’ fundamental values 
that is not yet reflected in market prices—thereby making 
stock prices more accurate.25 They specialize in using firm-
 
24 This simplified description of stock traders draws from a fuller 
model described in the seminal treatise on market microstructure alluded 
to earlier. See HARRIS, supra note 7. A more detailed description, such as 
the fuller one referenced here, would delineate sub-types and describe 
traders as operating to varying degrees across them. 
25 See generally supra Introduction & Part II.A.2. 
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specific and market-wide information to identify when 
stocks’ market prices are lower or higher than their 
fundamental values,26 and then buying when they encounter 
underpriced stocks and selling when they find overpriced 
ones. 
This group of traders is composed primarily of 
institutional traders—including some investment banks, 
hedge funds, private equity funds, and actively managed 
mutual funds. It is also thought to include some small subset 
of the universe of the individuals that buy and sell stocks 
through retail brokerage accounts. 
Importantly, relative to uninformed traders, informed 
traders as a whole trade in and out of stocks frequently. On 
one end of the informed-trader spectrum, some “high-
frequency” traders who are thought to be trading based on 
fundamental-value information enter and exit positions with 
the help of computer algorithms within less than one 
millisecond. On the other end of that spectrum, private 
equity funds, activist hedge funds, and actively managed 
mutual funds commonly hold stocks for years. However, even 
these longer-term informed traders generally enter and exit 
stock positions more frequently than uninformed traders do. 
2. Uninformed Traders 
In contrast to informed traders, uninformed traders are 
the market participants that buy and sell stocks for reasons 
other than those based on new fundamental-value 
information. Most commonly, they invest in stocks to store 
wealth for future consumption. As such, most of their trading 
is driven by the motivation to accumulate, adjust, or 
liquidate aspects of their desired portfolio of stocks.27 
Like informed traders, uninformed ones come in the form 
of both individuals and institutions. With regard to the 
former, scholars, regulators, and the trading industry 
 
26 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 714. 
27 See generally HARRIS, supra note 7, at 177–78 (describing these 
traders’ wealth-storing motivation as well as a host of other extra-
informational trading motivations). 
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generally assume that the great majority of individual retail-
level traders does not trade on the basis of superior 
information.28 With regard to the latter, many institutional 
traders (such as index-driven mutual funds, pension funds, 
and insurance-companies) pursue diversified portfolios of 
stock that allow them to earn a risk premium and are not 
trading based on unique new information about stocks’ 
fundamental values. 
Critically, unlike informed traders, the majority of 
uninformed traders buys and sells in and out of individual 
stocks only on an infrequent basis. In fact, a large portion of 
uninformed traders is made up of what are often referred to 
as “buy and hold” investors—that is, investors that purchase 
a number of stocks for their stock portfolio, and then hold 
them over sustained periods of time that are often more 
easily calculated by decades than milliseconds, seconds, 
days, weeks, or even months. For example, individuals often 
purchase stocks in their 401(k) accounts, holding those 
stocks until they sell them off to consume during retirement. 
And index-driven mutual funds generally accumulate 
diversified portfolios of stocks, trading only in a limited 
number of circumstances (such as when they must increase 
the size of their holdings when new investors buy into their 
investment funds).29 
3. Professional Liquidity-Providing Traders 
In today’s stock market, informed traders and uninformed 
traders that seek to buy or sell stock quickly are generally 
unable to trade with each other. Instead, they must trade 
through the third and final type of stock trader: the 
professional liquidity provider. Professional liquidity 
 
28 See, e.g., Christine A. Parlour & Uday Rajan, Payment for Order 
Flow, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 379, 381 (2003) (“Retail order flow is widely 
believed to be uninformed.”). 
29 Additionally, I group noise traders under the category of 
uninformed trader because they, by definition, are traders “who act 
irrationally, falsely believing that they possess some valuable 
informational advantage or superior trading skills.” Goshen & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 714–15.  
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providers are those that operate as intermediaries between 
other stock traders in a manner that allows those other 
traders to buy and sell stock in—at a minimum—a relatively 
quick timeframe. These professional traders typically 
maintain an inventory of shares for a large selection of 
public stocks,30 thereby allowing them to supply their 
liquidity services to the traders that seek to purchase and 
sell those stocks on demand. Professional liquidity providers 
mostly come in the form of high-frequency traders—that is, a 
type of trader that often enters and exits stock positions via 
complex algorithms within well under a millisecond. Thus, 
this third type of trader is essentially composed of a highly 
evolved version of traditional market makers, securities 
dealers, exchange specialists, and the like. 
Professional liquidity providers supply their services to 
other traders by executing their orders to buy and sell 
securities at, respectively, “ask” and “bid” prices. Ask prices 
are those at which these professionals are willing to sell 
stock from their inventories to those seeking to buy stock in 
a relatively quick timeframe, and thus represent the prices 
at which traders can buy stock quickly. For example, if a 
liquidity provider is executing traders’ buy orders at ask 
prices of $44.12 per share, an investor can procure the stock 
by paying $44.12 per share to the liquidity provider. 
Conversely, bid prices are those at which liquidity providers 
are willing to buy stock for their inventories from traders 
seeking to sell stock quickly, and therefore represent the 
prices at which traders can sell stock in a small timeframe. 
For example, if a liquidity provider is transacting traders’ 
sell orders at bid prices of $44.08 per share, then an investor 
 
30 See, e.g., Chris Concanon, President and Chief Operating Officer, 
Virtu Financial LLC, Columbia Law School and Business School Program 
on the Law and Economics of Capital Markets November 2012 Workshop 
on High-Frequency Trading (Nov. 29, 2012), available at 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/capital-markets/previous-workshops/2012, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Y5RS-67NG. Larger professional liquidity 
providers commonly supply liquidity services for all of the 5,000 or so 
exchange-listed equity securities in the United States. 
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can sell the stock to the liquidity provider by accepting 
$44.08 in return for each share sold. 
Crucially, professional liquidity providers’ ask prices are 
generally above the market’s current assessment of a stock’s 
fundamental value, and their bid prices are generally below 
that market value—with each spaced out equidistantly from 
it.31 This spacing out of their bid and ask prices around 
current market values allows liquidity providers to earn 
their “bid-ask spread”—that is, the revenue that they garner 
when they are able to buy shares from one trader at their 
lower bid prices and then turn around and sell them to 
another trader at their higher ask prices. Indeed, by placing 
their bid quotes and ask quotes equidistantly—yet not too 
far—away from stocks’ current market values, these 
professionals aim to attract an even two-sided flow of trader 
buy and sell orders that allows them to make their spread 
from a long line of stock buyers and sellers.32 For example, if 
the market currently assesses a stock’s fundamental value to 
be $44.10 per share, liquidity providers might be executing 
traders’ sell orders at their best (highest) bid prices of $44.08 
per share, and other traders’ buy orders at their best (lowest) 
ask prices of $44.12 per share. In this situation, the liquidity 
providers would earn $0.04 each time they bought a share 
from a trader at their $44.08 bid prices and turned around 
and sold that share to another at their $44.12 ask prices. 
Moreover, because professional liquidity providers 
transact at this bid-ask spread, there is generally a 
difference between, on the one hand, the prices at which 
traders can purchase and sell stocks quickly and, on the 
other, the market’s valuation of those stocks. This delta 
dictates that a trader seeking to buy a stock from a liquidity 
provider will generally pay more than the stock’s market 
value to procure it, and that a trader that wants to sell a 
stock to a liquidity provider will for the most part receive 
less than that value in return for it. Returning to the 
 
31 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 287 (“[Liquidity providers] . . . set their 
bids below fundamental values and their offers above them.”). 
32 See, e.g., id. at 401 (“[Liquidity providers] simply try to discover the 
prices that produce balanced two-sided order flows.”). 
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previous example, if the current value of a stock is, once 
again, $44.10 per share, and liquidity providers’ best (lowest) 
ask prices are $44.12 per share and their best (highest) bid 
prices are $44.08 per share, then a stock buyer must pay 
$0.02 more than the stock’s current market value of $44.10 
to procure the stock quickly, and, likewise, a stock seller 
must be willing to accept $0.02 less than that $44.10 value to 
sell the stock in a short timeframe. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the size of this delta 
between the market’s assessment of a stock’s fundamental 
value and liquidity providers’ ask and bid prices determines 
the quality of the prices received by the traders that transact 
against them. Bid and ask prices that are closer to that 
market assessment are superior, while such prices that are 
farther away from that market valuation are inferior. To 
continue the above example, stock buyers that pay another 
liquidity providers’ higher $44.13-per-share ask price would 
receive an inferior price, while those that pay yet another 
liquidity provider’s lower $44.11-per-share ask price would 
receive a superior one. 
Professional liquidity providers thus provide traders with 
a valuable service: they allow them to transact in a relatively 
fast timeframe. However, the ability to trade quickly comes 
with a caveat: those that buy from liquidity providers must 
pay their ask prices, and those that sell to them must accept 
their bid prices—ask and bid prices that are generally 
inferior to current market assessments of stocks’ values. 33 
B. Stock Trading Platforms 
Through the end of the twentieth century, the great 
majority of all stock trading took place through people on the 
floor of the New York Stock Exchange.34 However, there have 
 
33 This need to transact against these inferior prices is commonly 
viewed as giving rise to a “spread cost.” Thus, a buyer who bought the 
stock in the example in the text at a $44.12 ask price when its current 
market value was $44.10 would be said to have paid a $0.02 spread cost in 
order to trade on demand. 
34 The NYSE was able to maintain its dominance throughout that 
century, in part, by prohibiting its members from trading stocks anywhere 
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been enormous changes in the industrial organization of the 
stock market since the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
Those changes have resulted in stock trading now occurring 
almost entirely through two types of sophisticated electronic 
trading platforms: exchange platforms (through which a 
little over 60% of all trading takes place) and off-exchange 
platforms (through which the remaining almost 40% 
occurs).35 
 
else. See In the Midst of Revolution: The SEC, 1973–1981, SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/ 
galleries/rev/rev03g.php, archived at http://perma.cc/6ALF-EBNY. Many 
securities professionals would have faced serious impediments to 
conducting a successful business if they had been barred from trading on 
the dominant exchange. For that reason, they opted for membership to the 
NYSE, and avoided trading elsewhere. The extent to which exchange-
listed stocks were traded away from the “Big Board” was therefore limited 
in terms of both its sophistication and scope. However, in 1979, the SEC 
made it illegal for exchanges to prohibit their members from transacting 
at other exchanges—thereby paving the way for the emergence of 
competition from other exchanges. And in 2002, in the face of mounting 
SEC pressure, the NYSE repealed its member-limitation rule altogether—
which thus allowed for robust off-exchange competition from new highly 
sophisticated off-exchange platforms. The SEC now broadly proscribes 
exchanges from restricting where their members transact. See Securities 
Exchange Act Rule 19c-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-3 (2005). 
35 See, e.g., Rosenblatt Securities, Peeling the TRF Onion (2013) 
(unpublished study on file with the author); JPMORGAN, MARKET 
STRUCTURE UPDATE 3 (Sept. 17, 2013) (on file with author). Notably, the 
distribution of trading across these two platforms can vary widely by 
individual security. Some stocks trade 75% through off-exchange platforms 
and 25% via exchanges. Others trade 15% through off-exchange platforms 
and 85% via exchanges. See Maureen O’Hara, Is Market Fragmentation 
Harming Market Quality, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 459, 465 (June 2011). 
However, about half of all publicly traded stocks now have over 40% of 
their trading volume occurring through off-exchange platforms. See Frank 
Hatheway, Amy Kwan & Hui Zheng, An Empirical Analysis of Market 
Segmentation on U.S. Equities Markets (2013), 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economics-
studies/Segmentation%20%20Hatheway%20Kwan%20and%20Zheng%20S
eptember%202013%20draft%20%20v1.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/JMN6-WVF6. Moreover, the portion of all trading 
attributable to off-exchange platforms has risen at an impressive clip in 
the years since the New York Stock Exchange repealed its rule that 
effectively led to the overwhelming majority of all trading to take place on 
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1. Exchange Trading Platforms 
Contemporary stock exchanges—such as the well-known 
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Market—are 
electronic trading systems that operate continuous auctions 
in which liquidity providers post legally binding36 price 
quotes.37 More precisely, these exchange liquidity providers 
post firm ask price quotes—which allow other traders to 
purchase stocks from them at the quoted price on demand. 
And they display binding bid price quotes—which permit 
other traders to sell stocks to them in return for the quoted 
price immediately with certainty. Indeed, traders today may 
submit immediately executable buy and sell orders to one or 
more exchanges simultaneously and expect to transact even 
large quantities of shares against liquidity-provider quotes 
in a fraction of a millisecond.38 
 
its floor. In fact, just seven years ago, less than 15% of all trading occurred 
through off-exchange trading platforms. See, e.g., Rosenblatt Securities, 
supra. 
36 See Regulation National Market System Rule 602(b), 17 C.F.R. § 
242.602(b) (2005). 
37 Almost all exchange trading takes place through SEC-approved 
“registered national securities exchanges.” In addition to having to 
register and gain SEC approval to operate as such an exchange, see 
Securities and Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1934), these trading 
platforms are heavily regulated on an ongoing basis. See, e.g., id. § 19, 15 
U.S.C. § 78s (requiring exchanges to procure SEC approval before 
changing trading rules). Currently, there are eleven trading platforms 
that are registered with the SEC as stock exchanges. The remainder of 
exchange trading takes place through what are known as “electronic 
communications systems.” Unlike registered exchanges, however, these 
systems that too operate continuous auctions with firmly posted liquidity-
provider quotes are registered under Regulation of Exchanges and 
Alternative Trading System, which provides a more flexible framework 
than the one that governs registered exchanges. See Concept Release, 
supra note 2, at 18. ECNs now host as little as less than one percent of all 
trading. See id. at 14–15, 18. 
38 See Concept Release, supra note 2, at 16 (“The registered exchanges 
all have adopted highly automated trading systems that can offer 
extremely high-speed . . . order responses and executions. Published 
average response times . . . have been reduced to less than 1 millisecond.”). 
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Of paramount importance, trading at exchanges centers 
around more than simply these best liquidity-provider ask 
and bid quotes. At the threshold, exchange liquidity 
providers are not willing to post legally binding offers to the 
marketplace for infinite numbers of shares at their best ask 
and bid prices. For this reason, they quote a limited number 
of shares at those prices—and they then quote successively 
inferior ask and bid prices (both of which are also good for a 
set number of shares only). When traders exhaust the finite 
quantity that is firmly posted at those best prices, they must 
then trade at the next-best available price—and when the 
number of shares at that next-best price is exhausted, they 
must then transact at the next level of quoted prices, and so 
on. For example, assume again that exchange liquidity 
providers’ best (lowest) ask price quotes are $44.12 per 
share. These liquidity providers may be quoting only 1,000 
shares at that best ask price, with another 1,000 shares at a 
next-best ask price of $44.13 per share, and another 1,000 
shares at an even higher next-best ask price of $44.14 per 
share, and so on. A large investor seeking to buy, say, $10 
million of the stock immediately with certainty would 
therefore pay an average per-share execution price that is far 
higher than simply $44.12. 
Stock exchanges and the liquidity providers that post 
quotes on them thus provide traders with a valuable service 
above and beyond that provided by professional liquidity 
providers more generally: they allow traders to transact 
immediately with certainty against firm liquidity-provider 
quotes. However, the ability to trade on demand at 
exchanges comes with an even more significant version of 
the caveat associated with the services provided by liquidity 
providers more generally: stock buyers must pay exchange 
liquidity providers’ ask prices, and stock sellers must accept 
their bid prices. And again, as a general matter, these prices 
are at least nominally inferior to those received by traders 
that transact through off-exchange trading platforms. 
  
148 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2015 
2. Off-Exchange Trading Platforms39 
Off-exchange trading platforms are electronic trading 
systems through which liquidity providers—often the 
platform owners themselves—facilitate the execution of 
orders to buy and sell stocks at prices that reference those 
contemporaneously quoted through exchanges. By law, these 
off-exchange transactions must occur at ask and bid prices 
that are at least as good as the best ones then displayed on 
exchanges nationwide.40 And by practice, they generally 
occur at prices that are at least nominally superior to those 
exchange prices. 
Off-exchange platforms come in many forms across a wide 
spectrum. At one end of that spectrum, liquidity providers 
operating on these trading systems execute investor orders 
at prices that essentially match the best ones posted on 
exchanges. The traders that transact through these 
platforms also generally receive a nominal improvement on 
the exchange price—typically a mere hundredth of a penny 
($0.0001). For example, suppose once again that exchange 
liquidity providers are posting best (lowest) ask quotes of 
 
39 A large portion of the universe of these platforms has been referred 
to as “internalizing” platforms because they grew out of the practice in 
which businesses that operate as both stock brokers and stock dealers 
transacted their customers’ orders within their organizations—that is, 
without routing them to outside trading platforms or stock dealers. See 
generally HARRIS, supra note 7, at 514, 162. That term is now 
anachronistic because the manner in which these platforms function has 
greatly expanded over the past decade or more. Further, a large portion of 
off-exchange trading systems are labeled “dark pools,” ostensibly because 
they allow liquidity providers to provide bid and ask prices without openly 
displaying them—that is, “in the dark.” However, that term provides an 
inaccurate impression of the trading associated with these platforms 
because bid and ask prices available at these platforms are often readily 
discernible. Moreover, transactions through these “dark pools” are 
anything but opaque: they are, by law, immediately reported to the public 
in the same manner in which exchange transactions are reported to the 
public. See Regulation National Market System Rule 601, 17 C.F.R. § 
242.601 (2005). 
40 See Regulation National Market System Rule 611, 17 C.F.R. § 
242.611 (2005). 
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$44.12 per share. In this situation, a trader’s buy order that 
is executed at one of these off-exchange platforms would 
transact at a slightly better (lower) price of $44.1199 per 
share—thereby allowing the investor to purchase the stock 
at a $0.0001-per-share discount on the exchange price. 
In the middle of the off-exchange spectrum are trading 
platforms that facilitate trade execution that entails much 
more substantial improvement on exchange price quotes. To 
continue the previous example, if the best (lowest) ask quote 
for a stock on exchange platforms is $44.12 per share, then 
off-exchange platforms may execute traders’ orders to buy 
stock at a significantly better (lower) ask price of $44.11 per 
share. 
Lastly, although they are uncommon today, at the other 
end of the off-exchange spectrum are trading systems that 
help traders transact at the midpoint between the best 
exchange ask and bid quotes. Market participants’ orders 
that are routed to these trading platforms therefore execute 
at what is generally the stock’s current market value.41 
Indeed, this last type of off-exchange platform generally 
crosses traders’ buy and sell orders against each other at 
that price—allowing traders to provide liquidity directly to 
each other, and thereby removing professional liquidity-
provider intermediation from the trading process 
altogether.42 Thus, the trader in our earlier example would 
transact at $44.10—which was halfway between the best 
(highest) bid price in the market of $44.08 and the best 
(lowest) ask price of $44.12. 
Focusing on the market participants that trade stocks as 
well as the platforms through which they conduct their 
buying and selling, this Part has laid out important 
information on how stocks are traded in the contemporary 
stock market. And Part II before it provided an equally 
relevant overview relating to the accuracy of stock prices—
including consensus views as to the main social benefits of 
enhanced accuracy. With this background, the next Part 
 
41 See generally supra Part III.A.3. 
42 See, e.g., O’Hara, supra note 35, at 463 tbl. 1. 
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offers novel insights on how central, yet little-noticed stock-
market rules affect contemporary stock trading as well as 
stock-price accuracy and its main social benefits. Moreover, 
it explains why these insights lead to the conclusion that 
lawmakers, as a matter of theory, have a fourth main 
securities-law tool (stock-market law) for increasing both the 
accuracy of public companies’ stock prices and the main 
benefits that flow from more accurate stock prices. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRAL, YET LITTLE-
NOTICED, STOCK-MARKET RULES 
The trading-platform access rules allow off-exchange 
platforms to determine which traders can and cannot buy 
and sell stocks through their trading systems, while 
requiring exchanges to remain open to all traders.43 As 
shown in this Part, these underappreciated stock-market 
rules theoretically affect contemporary stock trading in a 
manner that ultimately results in informed traders facing 
price quotes that are both inferior and more sensitive to 
trading activity. Facing these altered price quotes, informed 
traders have fewer profitable trading opportunities and 
therefore a lower incentive to produce (or pay in return for) 
information about firms’ prospects. This lower incentive, in 
turn, leads to a situation in which society generates less of 
this valuable information. As a result, stock prices are 
materially less accurate than they otherwise might be—that 
is, the lower level of stock-price accuracy affects the quality 
under which corporations are governed and with which 
capital is allocated. In the end, these theoretical effects on 
contemporary stock trading and stock-price accuracy and its 
main social benefits lead to the inference that lawmakers 
have an additional securities-law tool for materially 
increasing the accuracy of public companies’ stock prices. 
That is, they can enhance the accuracy of these prices in a 
manner that improves corporate governance and capital 
allocation not just by making adjustments to well-studied 
 
43 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
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core of securities law (disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading 
laws), but also by changing stock-market law. 
Section A examines the likely effects of the trading-
platform access rules on contemporary stock trading. Section 
B then explores the likely impact of those effects on stock-
price accuracy and its main social benefits. Finally, Section C 
explains why these theories lead to the conclusion that 
lawmakers have a previously unidentified way in which they 
can materially bolster the accuracy of public companies’ 
stock prices. 
A. Contemporary Stock Trading 
As a matter of theory, the trading-platform access rules 
result in off-exchange trading being dominated by 
uninformed traders. And because almost 40% of all trading44 
occurs through these platforms that are dominated by 
uninformed traders, trading at exchanges necessarily 
involves a far higher ratio of informed traders to uninformed 
ones than it otherwise might. In response to this higher 
ratio, the exchange trading environment changes in ways 
that result in exchange liquidity providers quoting prices 
that are both inferior and more sensitive to trading activity. 
1. Off-Exchange Trading 
At the threshold, there is strong reason to believe that the 
legal ability of off-exchange platforms to determine which 
traders can and cannot access their trading systems results 
in off-exchange trading being dominated by uninformed 
traders. Off-exchange platforms likely use their legal ability 
to discriminate among traders in order to target uninformed 
traders and exclude informed ones. In the moments after 
uninformed traders buy or sell stocks, stock prices are 
generally stable. After all, these traders are not trading 
based on information as to mispricings that will soon become 
apparent to the market. This price stability allows those that 
supply liquidity services to uninformed traders to generate 
 
44 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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revenue by purchasing from some of them at their lower bid 
prices and selling to others at their higher ask prices. To 
continue the basic example used earlier, liquidity providers 
may be able to buy a stock at their best (highest) $44.08-per-
share bid prices from some uninformed traders, and then—
before prices move—sell at their best (lowest) $44.12-per-
share ask prices to other uninformed traders, thereby 
gaining $0.04 per share bought from one trader and sold to 
another. 
Because liquidity providers can profit from their bid-ask 
spread when they supply their services to uninformed 
traders, off-exchange platforms can earn revenue by meeting 
those market participants’ trading needs. For one thing, 
these platforms can bring in money by supplying liquidity 
services to uninformed traders on their own platforms. For 
another, they can earn income by using their uninformed-
trader clients in order to attract others to perform that 
liquidity-supply function on their platforms. When they do 
so, the platforms can earn revenue in a variety of ways—
including by charging those external liquidity providers in 
return for the right to supply their services through the 
platforms, by charging traders in return for the ability to 
access those liquidity providers’ ask and bid prices on the 
platforms, or by charging for the dissemination of trading 
data attributable to trades that took place through the 
platforms. Accordingly, there is strong reason to believe that 
off-exchange platforms target uninformed traders because 
they can earn profits by meeting their trading needs. 
Empirical evidence supports this assertion, as shown by 
the example of individual, retail-investor trading in the 
contemporary stock market.  These investors are generally 
presumed to be uninformed ones.45 And the SEC has found 
that retail stockbrokers—generally in return for payments 
from off-exchange platforms—now route nearly 100% of 
immediately executable orders from individual traders to 
 
45 See Parlour & Rajan, supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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these platforms.46 Furthermore, all of the major exchanges 
have filed applications with the SEC requesting permission 
to operate off-exchange platforms that explicitly target retail 
investors and exclude institutional ones with the stated 
purpose of competing against off-exchange platforms in the 
market for individual investors’ orders to buy and sell 
stock.47 
At the same time, there is also strong reason to believe 
that off-exchange platforms use their legal discretion to deny 
access to their platforms in order to exclude informed 
traders. In contrast to the moments after uninformed traders 
buy and sell stocks, immediately after informed traders 
transact, prices generally move.48 These price changes often 
occur so quickly that those that provided liquidity services to 
the informed traders—traders that have more information 
about stocks’ fundamental values than liquidity providers 
have49—get stuck having bought a stock for their inventory 
that was overvalued, or having sold one that was 
undervalued. For this reason, providing liquidity services to 
 
46 See Concept Release, supra note 2, at 21 (“A review of the order 
routing disclosures required by Rule 606 of Regulation [National Market 
System] of eight broker-dealers with significant retail customer accounts 
reveals that nearly 100% of their customer market orders are routed to 
[off-exchange trading platforms].”). 
47 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, Order Granting 
Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Adopting NYSE Rule 107C to 
Establish a Retail Liquidity Program for NYSE-Listed Securities, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-67347 (July 3, 2012). 
48 See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining how trader buying and selling 
activity generally places, respectively, upward and downward pressure on 
prices). 
49 See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 725 (“[Liquidity 
providers] . . . do not invest as much time and effort in collecting and 
analyzing this information [as informed traders do].”); HARRIS, supra note 
7, at 277 (“[Liquidity providers] tend to . . . not know much about . . . the 
fundamental values of the instruments that they trade.”); supra Part III.A. 
(explaining that professional liquidity providers primarily focus on 
maintaining a two-sided flow of buy and sell orders, while informed 
traders’ main aim is to acquire information that indicates a mispricing). 
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informed traders is generally a losing proposition.50 Indeed, 
it is well established that liquidity providers incur costs in 
the form of trading losses when they supply their liquidity 
services to informed traders.51 And it is likewise well 
established that these losses to informed traders form one of 
the main costs associated with the liquidity-provision 
business. Thus, off-exchange platforms presumably use their 
legal ability to exclude in order to exclude informed traders 
so that they can mitigate this cost that informed traders 
impose on liquidity providers.52 
Moreover, the legal ability to discriminate among traders 
also theoretically results in trading at these platforms being 
dominated by uninformed traders because it leads a 
significant portion of informed traders to prefer to complete 
much of its trading through exchanges. Inherent in the legal 
ability to select which traders they will and will not welcome 
is the ability to select which trader orders they will and will 
not transact. Liquidity providers generally want to execute 
only an even two-sided stream of buy and sell orders that 
allows them to earn the difference between their higher ask 
prices and lower bid prices.53 Off-exchange liquidity 
providers therefore have an incentive to execute only those 
orders that will allow them to maintain a flow of trader 
orders that is at least somewhat balanced, and to avoid 
 
50 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 299 (“[I]nformed traders choose the 
side of the market on which they trade, and the [liquidity providers] end 
up losing money to them.”). 
51 For the seminal work identifying and measuring this liquidity-
provider cost, see generally Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, 
Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously 
Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985). 
52 Of course, off-exchange platforms will at times have difficulty 
identifying—and therefore excluding—informed traders. However, these 
platforms have plenary access to their customers’ identities and trading 
performance, and—not unlike a casino—can exclude known informed 
traders and repeat winners. Moreover, these platforms may also exclude 
informed traders by only granting access to traders who they know are 
uninformed (such as familiar portfolio managers at index funds). 
53 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 401 (“[Liquidity providers] simply try 
to discover the prices that produce balanced two-sided order flows.”). 
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providing liquidity services opposite a disproportionately 
high set of buy orders or sell orders. As a result, they will 
often not execute orders from even the traders to which they 
grant access—let alone execute them with certainty within 
less than a millisecond as exchanges do. In fact, these 
platforms often reject—or at least do not immediately 
execute—the trader orders they receive. Consequently, these 
traders and their brokers must route their orders to other 
off-exchange platforms—with orders commonly going 
through several such platforms in succession.54 In fact, 
orders are often routed to several such platforms before 
ultimately being sent to exchanges for guaranteed execution. 
In the end, the legal ability to select which traders they will 
and will not allow to access them can result in these trading 
systems providing liquidity services that entail, at a 
minimum, some material time delay—and, at a maximum, 
no execution whatsoever. Thus, the legal ability to pick and 
choose traders—which includes the power to select specific 
trader orders and reject or pass on others—also results in 
off-exchange platforms operating in a manner that provides 
traders with relatively little speed and certainty value.55 
Speed and certainty are often of special concern to 
informed traders. Informed traders profit based on an 
information asset: information about firms’ prospects that is 
not yet incorporated into their market prices.56 However, the 
value of this asset generally depreciates over time. Moreover, 
the time period over which it loses its value is frequently 
small for three reasons. First, slow trade execution by the 
initial investor to procure information risks that other 
 
54 See Robert A. Bright, Dennis Dick & Diane Anderson, Untitled SEC 
Comment Letter (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-02-10/s70210-63.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G5F2-
X2DA. 
55 Orders submitted to the off-exchange platforms that cross traders’ 
orders against each other without the intermediation of a professional 
liquidity provider, see supra Part III.B.2, are associated with an especially 
low level of execution speed and certainty because they require 
corresponding, opposite-side orders in order to facilitate a trade. 
56 See generally supra Part III.A.1. 
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traders will have time to discover the information and trade 
on it first, thereby causing prices to reflect that information 
before the initial trader can profit on it.57 Second, when 
information is known by the corporate issuer of a stock, but 
has not been made public by that issuer, the issuer may at 
any time make it public via disclosure or other means—
thereby greatly reducing or eliminating altogether the value 
of the information to an informed trader who had procured it 
earlier.58 Third, and perhaps most importantly, slow and 
uncertain execution risks that an informed trader’s own 
transactions themselves will alert the rest of the market to 
its information before it can capture sufficient trading 
profits.59 As a result, many informed traders place a high 
premium on the ability to transact quickly with certainty. In 
fact, for these traders execution speed and certainty are 
often more important than even the quality of the prices they 
receive.60 So, to maximize the profits that they earn based on 
their depreciating asset, even those informed traders that 
are able to access off-exchange platforms often prefer to 
complete much of their trading at exchanges.61 
 
57 See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, at 1267 (“Because 
[informed traders] operate in a competitive environment to maximize the 
return on investment in information, the [informed trader] who first 
obtains nonpublic information will have to process the information to the 
market as quickly as possible, lest she be beaten by other [informed 
traders].”). 
58 Once the information is publicly disclosed, any trader that is able to 
analyze its import can trade on it. Further, liquidity providers themselves 
may learn of this publicly disseminated information and adjust their bid 
and ask prices accordingly. 
59 See generally infra Part IV.B. (explaining how liquidity providers 
adjust their price quotes—and therefore market prices—in response to 
large one-sided buying or selling activity within milliseconds). 
60 See O’Hara, supra note 35, at 463 (“For some traders, [execution] 
speed is more important than [the inferior prices often associated with 
transacting at large bid-ask] spread[s].”). 
61 To be sure, some subset of the informed-trader universe will 
nevertheless want to conduct a portion of its trading through off-exchange 
platforms. For example, many activist hedge funds, private equity funds, 
and actively managed mutual funds trade based on information that does 
not depreciate in value as quickly as many other types of information. 
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Lastly, it is important to recall that traders are only able 
to transact at off-exchange platforms at prices that are equal 
to or better than those posted on exchanges.62 Those that 
trade off-exchange will therefore often face only a relatively 
small number of shares available at these platforms because 
liquidity providers are only willing to supply so much 
liquidity at those top prices.63 As a result, informed traders 
will be forced to turn to exchanges to complete their desired 
trading at those prices as well as the next-best ask and bid 
prices—meaning that there is a second reason why informed 
traders will prefer to complete much of their trading through 
exchanges. 
Thus, as a matter of theory, the trading-platform access 
rules result in off-exchange trading being dominated by 
uninformed traders.   
2. Exchange Trading 
In addition to their impact on off-exchange trading, the 
trading-platform access rules also leave their mark on 
exchange trading. Because these rules require exchanges to 
welcome all traders, exchange trading is characterized by a 
mix of both informed and uninformed traders. However, 
almost 40% of all trading now occurs through off-exchange 
platforms,64 which are theoretically dominated by 
uninformed traders as a result of their ability to discriminate 
among traders. With such a large portion of the uninformed-
 
They therefore likely meet some of their trading needs through both 
exchanges and off-exchange platforms via smaller trades over a sustained 
period. Furthermore, even the informed traders that do have 
informational assets that depreciate more quickly routinely attempt to 
achieve their speed and certainty goals by at least initially sending their 
orders to both exchanges and off-exchange platforms simultaneously when 
they begin trading. 
62 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
63 See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining this concept in the closely related 
context of exchange liquidity providers and the limited number of shares 
that they are willing to offer at their best (lowest) ask prices and best 
(highest) bid prices). 
64 See O’Hara, supra note 35, at 465. 
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trader universe now transacting via off-exchange platforms, 
exchange trading necessarily entails a far higher ratio of 
informed traders to uninformed ones than it otherwise 
might. 
3. Exchange Liquidity Providers’ Price Quotes 
Of critical importance here, the heightened ratio of 
informed traders to uninformed ones discussed immediately 
above creates an exchange trading environment that causes 
exchange liquidity providers to quote prices that are both 
inferior and more sensitive to trading activity. 
Professional liquidity providers will not supply their 
services unless they can earn revenues that outweigh their 
costs. And one of their largest costs arises out of the trading 
losses that informed traders impose on them.65 Moreover, 
exchange liquidity providers are especially concerned with 
these costs. For one thing, when these liquidity providers 
post their quotes, those quotes must—by law—be firm.66 For 
another, any trader—also by law—may access those firm 
quotes.67 To maintain a business with revenues that at least 
equal their costs, these vulnerable liquidity providers must 
therefore be particularly aware of how to offset the trading-
loss costs imposed by informed traders. 
The main way in which exchange liquidity providers 
offset the costs that informed traders impose on them is by 
garnering revenues via spread-earning transactions with 
uninformed traders.68 Liquidity providers generate revenues 
by purchasing from some uninformed traders at their lower 
bid prices, and more or less contemporaneously selling to 
 
65 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
66 See supra note 37. 
67 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part 
III.B.1. 
68 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 51, at 72; HARRIS, supra note 7, 
at 299 (stating that exchange liquidity providers seek “to recoup from 
uninformed traders what they lose to informed traders.”); see generally 
Albert S. Kyle, Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition, 56 REV. 
ECON. STUDIES 317 (1989) (providing the seminal articulation of this well-
established principle of market microstructure). 
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other uninformed traders at their higher ask prices.69 
Indeed, the primary goal of those in the liquidity-provision 
business is to determine the bid and ask prices that will 
allow them to maintain a two-sided flow of sell and buy 
orders so that they can complete as many of these spread-
earning transactions as possible—and so that they, at a 
minimum, have enough revenue from these transactions to 
more than cover their costs (including those imposed by 
informed traders). 
Additionally, exchange liquidity providers are able to 
increase the chances of garnering sufficient revenues to 
cover their costs by minimizing the costs imposed by 
informed traders. Specifically, they minimize these costs by 
altering their price quotes in two well-known ways. First, 
exchange liquidity providers minimize the costs imposed by 
informed traders by quoting inferior prices. Inferior prices 
reduce the extent to which informed traders will spot 
profitable trading opportunities.70 To return to the example 
used much earlier, imagine that the market currently 
assesses the value of a stock to be $44.10 per share, that 
exchange liquidity providers are providing best (lowest) ask 
quotes of $44.12 per share, and that informed traders have 
information that leads them to conclude that the stock is 
actually worth $44.17 per share. If these traders buy the 
stock at $44.12 per share from the liquidity providers, then 
they will profit at the liquidity providers’ expense. However, 
if the liquidity providers instead were quoting inferior 
$44.18-per-share best ask prices, then these traders would 
not be able to trade profitably—and they therefore would not 
impose trading losses on the liquidity providers. 
Of paramount importance here, exchange liquidity 
providers do not merely decrease the costs imposed by 
informed traders by quoting inferior best (lowest) ask quotes 
and best (highest) bid quotes. They also decrease these costs 
by altering the number of shares that they are willing to 
trade at those prices as well as the number that they are 
 
69 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
70 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 6, 298. 
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willing to trade at their successively inferior quoted prices.71 
For example, a liquidity provider may quote a $44.12-per-
share best (lowest) ask price, albeit while posting a mere 500 
shares at that price rather than 1,000, another 500 shares at 
$44.13 per share rather than 1,000, and so on. Accordingly, 
exchange liquidity providers may decrease their losses to 
informed traders by quoting inferior prices—including both 
inferior best (lowest) ask prices and best (highest) bid prices 
as well as inferior quantities of shares at those prices and 
beyond. 
Second, and equally as important here, exchange liquidity 
providers decrease the costs imposed by informed traders by 
altering the sensitivity of their quote-adjustment triggers. 
These liquidity providers alter their price quotes in response 
to the information that they glean from trading activity and 
more. It is such liquidity-provider alterations that result in 
informed traders’ information being absorbed into market 
prices.72 And in today’s market, these price changes 
commonly occur within mere milliseconds after trades are 
executed. For example, suppose again that exchange 
liquidity providers are posting best (lowest) ask quotes of 
$44.12 per share, and that they observe net buying against 
ask quotes in the market more generally for 30,000 shares in 
a short time period. After observing that buying activity, 
they may increase their best (lowest) ask quotes up from 
$44.12 per share to $44.16 per share in order to protect 
themselves from incurring losses to informed traders. But if 
they wanted even more protection, they may update their 
quotes upward after observing only 10,000 shares of such 
buying activity in that same time period. Thus, exchange 
liquidity providers also mitigate their losses to informed 
traders by lowering the threshold that elicits their price-
quote adjustments. 
 
71 See generally supra Part III.B.2 (detailing these aspects of 
exchange liquidity providers’ quotes). 
72 See generally supra Part II.A.2 (describing the process in which 
fundamental-value information is incorporated into stocks’ market prices 
as a consequence of trading activity). 
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The trading-platform access rules, however, lead to a 
trading environment on exchanges in which the main source 
of revenue for exchange liquidity providers is far smaller 
than it otherwise might be. Those rules result in large 
numbers of uninformed traders completing their trading 
through off-exchange platforms rather than exchanges. To 
ensure that they have revenues that exceed their costs 
despite this lower revenue received from uninformed traders, 
exchange liquidity providers must take steps to further 
reduce the costs imposed by informed traders. They do so by 
bolstering their price-quote defenses against informed-trader 
losses—that is, by quoting inferior prices73 and reducing the 
trading-activity thresholds that trigger their adjustments to 
their prices. Accordingly, the far higher ratio of informed 
 
73 A parallel work in progress in financial economics provides 
preliminary empirical support for the proposition that the growth of off-
exchange trading is causing exchange liquidity providers to quote inferior 
prices. See Frank Hatheway, Amy Kwan & Hui Zheng, An Empirical 
Analysis of Market Segmentation on U.S. Equities Markets 3 (Working 
Paper, 2014) (“[O]ur results show that [off-exchange] venues successfully 
segment the market and attract uninformed order flow from [exchanges]. 
The resulting market fragmentation leaves liquidity providers worse off on 
[exchanges], consequently harming overall market quality.”), available at 
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/files/Documents/Centers/CFP/research/hathe
way_kwan_zheng.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HM4Z-NYUB. Moreover, 
financial economists have empirically demonstrated that previous 
diversions of far narrower sets of uninformed traders away from far 
narrower sets of liquidity providers caused those liquidity providers to 
quote inferior prices. See David Easley, Nicholas M. Kiefer & Maureen 
O’Hara, Cream-Skimming or Profit-Sharing? The Curious Role of 
Purchased Order Flow, 51 J. FIN. 811, 831 (1996) (“Since the orders 
diverted [away from the New York Stock Exchange and to regional 
exchanges] are the [informationally] ‘least risky,’ an adverse selection 
problem arises with respect to the remaining order flow [that goes to the 
New York Stock Exchange]. This, in turn, dictates that prices on the 
NYSE will worsen to reflect the change in order composition.”); see 
generally Mark J. Ready, The Specialist’s Discretion: Stopped Orders and 
Price Improvement, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 1075 (1999) (evidencing that the 
New York Stock Exchange specialized liquidity providers were using their 
privileges to transact against uninformed traders, leaving external 
liquidity providers that posted quotes at the exchange to face a higher 
ratio of informed traders to uninformed ones than they might otherwise 
have faced, and therefore causing them to quote inferior prices). 
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traders to uninformed ones caused by the trading-platform 
access rules elicits a response from exchange liquidity 
providers: they quote prices that are both inferior and more 
sensitive to trading activity. 
B. Stock-Price Accuracy and Its Main Social Benefits 
The inferior and more sensitive quotes posted by 
exchange liquidity providers that theoretically result from 
the trading-platform access rules have considerable import 
for informed traders. Specifically, they affect their trading 
profits—and therefore the extent to which these traders will 
invest in the production of information about firms’ 
prospects. And for that reason, the exchange trading 
environment to which the trading-platform access rules lead 
has significant theoretical implications for both stock-price 
accuracy and its main social benefits. 
1. Stock-Price Accuracy 
Informed traders will only produce or procure information 
about firms’ fundamental values and impound it into market 
prices if they can earn trading profits.74 And to earn trading 
profits, they must bring in trading revenues that surpass 
their costs. These costs include considerable ones such as 
those relating to the procurement and analysis of 
fundamental-value information. Informed traders therefore 
must often buy and sell stock in large quantities to realize 
revenues sufficient to offset the high costs associated with 
their valuable work.75 
However, it is likely that informed traders are to some 
significant extent relegated to transacting against firm 
liquidity-provider quotes on exchanges. For one thing, there 
is strong reason to believe that informed traders are often 
excluded by off-exchange trading platforms.76 For another, it 
 
74 See generally supra Part II.A.2; supra Part III.A.1. 
75 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 290 (“[I]nformed traders like to acquire 
large positions in order to maximize their profits”). 
76 See generally supra Part IV.A.1. 
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is likely that a large portion of even those informed traders 
that are able to access off-exchange platforms prefers to 
complete much of its trading through exchanges in order to 
trade quickly with certainty against firm liquidity-provider 
quotes.77 And, as a result of the trading-platform access 
rules, the price quotes that they face on exchanges are both 
of lower quality and more sensitive to trading activity than 
they might otherwise be.78 
The lower-quality price quotes and more sensitive quote-
adjustment triggers associated with the current exchange 
trading environment—by liquidity-provider design—
decrease informed traders’ profits. The inferior-pricing 
aspect of that environment decreases informed-trader profits 
by decreasing the margin between the prices for which these 
traders can purchase undervalued stocks and those for which 
they can sell them. (Inferior quotes also decrease informed-
trader profits by decreasing the short-sale margin between 
the price for which these traders can sell overvalued stocks 
and the price for which they can re-purchase them.) To 
illustrate this point, suppose once again that the market 
currently values a stock at $44.10 per share and that an 
informed trader has information that leads it to conclude 
that the stock is really worth $44.15 per share. If liquidity 
providers are posting best (lowest) ask prices of $44.12 per 
share, then the informed trader will be able to buy the stock 
at $44.12 per share, and then—after the market recognizes 
the underlying information—sell it at some higher price that 
reflects that more accurate $44.15-per-share value. However, 
if exchange liquidity providers—in response to the high ratio 
of informed traders to uninformed ones associated with 
exchange trading—are posting best (lowest) ask prices of 
$44.15 per share, then our informed trader will not find a 
profit margin that incentivizes it to use its information to 
purchase this undervalued security. 
The quote-adjustment-trigger aspect of the current 
exchange trading environment likewise prevents informed 
 
77 See generally id. 
78 See generally supra Part IV.A.3. 
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traders from garnering profits that they might otherwise 
gain. These more reactive triggers greatly reduce the size of 
informed-trader profits. In fact, these sensitive price quotes 
are likely the primary intra-market business concern of 
informed traders today—as highlighted by descriptions of 
the contemporary stock market in a recent highly publicized 
book by best-selling author Michael Lewis.79 To explain the 
point, start again with the assumption that the market 
currently values a stock at $44.10 per share, and that our 
informed trader again has information that leads it to 
conclude that the stock is really worth $44.15 per share. 
Even if the best (lowest) liquidity-provider ask quote in the 
market is $44.12 per share, the informed trader will expect 
only a small profit if just milliseconds after it purchases, say, 
5,000 shares at that price, all liquidity providers in the 
market move their best (lowest) ask prices up by $0.05 per 
share to $44.17 per share.80 
When informed traders expect smaller trading profits, 
they will invest less in the production of information about 
firms’ prospects. As a result, a lower amount of information 
as to firms’ values will be produced—and therefore a lower 
amount will be incorporated into stock prices. Even more, 
when the profits associated with informed trading for any 
 
79 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT 
(2014). Interestingly, Lewis’s central gripe about the “rigged” American 
stock market, to use his words on a popular Sunday evening television 
news magazine episode, appears to be this aspect of the market. Given the 
exchange trading environment described above in Parts IV.A.2 and IV.A.3, 
the process in which information is incorporated into stock prices 
described above in Part II.A., and well-established models of the economics 
of the stock market traceable to work by Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. 
Milgrom in 1985, see supra note 51, the market appears to be operating 
exactly as one would think it should. That is, with price quotes quite 
quickly reflecting significant buying or selling activity given the chances 
that such activity is the result of trading based on superior information. 
80 Liquidity providers throughout the market learn of transactions 
right after they occur. See Regulation National Market System, Rule 601, 
17 C.F.R. § 242.601 (2005) (requiring all platforms to report transactions 
executed through their systems immediately after they take place). This 
transaction-reporting system leads to market-wide price movements even 
after trading that is isolated to as little as one liquidity provider. 
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particular stock drop below a certain threshold, the 
informed-trader incentive to follow the stock and research its 
value disappears altogether. Thus, the federal securities 
laws that allow off-exchange platforms to pick who can and 
who cannot access their trading systems while requiring 
exchanges to grant access to all traders theoretically result 
in informed traders spotting fewer profit opportunities than 
they otherwise might—and therefore lead society to achieve 
a lower level of stock-price accuracy than it otherwise 
might.81 
Notably, this concern about the effect of the trading-
platform access rules on stock-price accuracy is likely 
relevant for the overwhelming majority of the 5,000 or so 
stocks that are publicly traded in the American stock 
market. After all, about half of all publicly traded stocks 
have over 40% of their trading taking place via off-exchange 
platforms.82 However, the concern is perhaps most 
significant for the stocks of firms on the small- and medium-
size end of the public-firm spectrum, as opposed to household 
names such as Apple, ExxonMobile, and Wal-Mart. Liquidity 
 
81 At first glance, the posited relationship between these trading rules 
and stock-price accuracy may appear to be at odds with what may be the 
best-known theory in financial economics: the efficient-market hypothesis. 
However, it is important to note that the concept of stock-price accuracy is 
distinct from that of market efficiency. The latter concerns the extent to 
which information, once public, is incorporated into market prices. It 
therefore depends primarily on the process in which public information is 
incorporated into those prices. The former instead focuses on the extent to 
which market prices reflect fundamental values. It therefore turns not 
only on the process in which information is incorporated into prices, but 
also on the extent to which information is produced. This distinction is 
perhaps best explained by recognizing that prices can be highly efficient, 
yet not accurate whatsoever. To illustrate the point, imagine a firm that 
discloses only the bare minimum about its business to the public, and 
otherwise operates with secrecy. That firm’s stock price may be perfectly 
efficient in today’s market. After all, as soon as information about its 
prospects comes out, even a small amount of trading based on that 
information would immediately affect its market price. However, that 
price may still be highly inaccurate because little information on the firm’s 
prospects may have been produced. 
82 See Hatheway, Kwan & Zheng, supra note 35. 
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provision for these stocks tends to be characterized by 
inferior pricing and very sensitive quote-adjustment 
triggers—making it hard for informed traders to identify 
pricing inaccuracies that allow them to earn significant 
trading profits before market prices adjust to the information 
on which they are trading. Not surprisingly, informed 
traders and others tend to produce far less information about 
these firms relative to larger ones. In fact, some large portion 
of these firms lacks a robust informed-trader following 
altogether, and relatively little is known about the future 
cash flows that they will produce. So, while the trading-
platform access rules lead to an exchange trading 
environment that theoretically impedes stock-price accuracy 
for the great majority of all public companies, this effect is 
perhaps most disconcerting for smaller- and mid-size 
companies. 
2. The Main Social Benefits of Accurate Stock 
Prices 
As a general matter, laws that result in society 
generating a lower level of stock-price accuracy deprive 
society of valuable benefits (namely, those relating to 
corporate governance and capital allocation).83 To be sure, 
though, not all effects on stock-price accuracy emanate to 
affect the quality of these benefits.84 For example, think 
about laws that would require firms to disclose new material 
information within a minute of learning of that information 
rather than within, say, a week. Such laws that result in 
information about firms’ fundamental values being 
incorporated into their stock prices within minutes of a new 
development rather than a week are unlikely to result in any 
sort of disconcerting misallocation of capital. Thus, despite 
the general concern about laws that reduce stock-price 
 
83 See generally supra Part II.B. (describing the main social benefits of 
more accurate stock prices). 
84 See generally Kahan, supra note 4 (comparing instances in which 
enhanced stock-price accuracy results in significant social benefits with 
those in which it does not lead to such benefits). 
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accuracy, not all such reductions are of the kind about which 
society should care. 
Critically, there is reason to believe that the effects on 
stock-price identified here are important to society. These 
effects on stock-price accuracy are traceable to the incentive 
to produce information about firms’ values. And that 
incentive drives the process that results in accurate stock 
prices.85 More specifically, the trading-platform access rules 
deprive informed traders of profits that would otherwise 
incentivize them to engage in their price-correcting work. 
These rules therefore reduce the extent to which informed 
traders will produce or procure information about firms’ 
values. As a result, less such information will be produced—
and stock prices will drift away from their values for 
sustained periods measured more easily in weeks than 
milliseconds. In fact, for whichever of the 5,000 or so public 
companies in America that struggle to attract informed 
traders to follow them and analyze their prospects, a lower 
incentive to produce fundamental-value information and 
engage in price-correcting work can cause a loss of an 
informed-trader following altogether.86 Accordingly, the 
trading-platform access rules’ effect on stock-price accuracy 
is likely of the kind that has a negative impact on the quality 
of firm governance and capital allocation, and not merely 
some immaterial one. 
C. Securities Law’s Effort to Obtain a Socially Optimal 
Level of Stock-Price Accuracy 
The conclusion that central aspects of the law governing 
stock trading are leading society to generate a materially 
lower level of stock-price accuracy than it otherwise might 
leads to a key inference: lawmakers have a new securities-
law tool for improving stock-price accuracy. In different 
words, the theoretical effects of trading-platform access rules 
 
85 See generally supra Part II.A.2. 
86 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, at 1263–66 
(highlighting concerns about the accuracy of firms’ stock prices and more 
when informed traders cease to follow those firms). 
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set out earlier in this Part suggest that modifications to 
stock-market law would alter contemporary stock trading in 
a way that would enhance stock-price accuracy and its main 
social benefits. This conclusion becomes clear by thinking 
about two examples of ways in which stock-market law could 
be modified in order to spur the production of accurate stock 
prices: by implementing an exchange-trading mandate, or by 
requiring a public-firm subsidy for exchange liquidity 
provision. 
1. Materially Improving Stock-Price Accuracy via 
an Exchange-Trading Mandate 
One way in which stock-market law could be altered to 
materially enhance the accuracy of stock prices would be by 
mandating that all trading take place through exchanges. 
Such a general prohibition on trading via sophisticated 
electronic platforms that fail to both post firm quotes and 
allow all traders to access them would affect the exchange 
trading environment in a manner that would lead to both 
more accurate stock prices and more of the benefits that 
generally flow from them. After all, the mandate would 
result in exchange liquidity providers facing a markedly 
lower ratio of informed traders to uninformed ones than they 
currently encounter. As a result, these liquidity providers 
would have more opportunities to offset the losses they incur 
to informed traders by completing spread-earning 
transactions with uninformed traders. Assuming healthy 
competition in the exchange liquidity-provision business,87 
these liquidity providers would respond by posting superior 
price quotes and increasing the threshold that triggers their 
 
87 Large- and medium-size firms are commonly held by large 
uninformed institutional investors and more. For this reason, professional 
liquidity providers face competition—for at least these stocks—from not 
only a healthy set of fellow liquidity-providing professionals seeking to 
cater to these uninformed traders’ needs, but also from these uninformed 
traders themselves. See infra Part V.A.2.a (explaining that uninformed 
traders commonly accomplish their trading needs by acting as liquidity 
providers to other traders—that is, by completing their buying needs via 
bid quotes and their selling needs via ask quotes). 
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adjustments of those price quotes. In such a trading 
environment, informed traders would have more 
opportunities to profit based on superior information as to 
firm’s fundamental values. And for that reason, they (and 
those from whom they procure information) would have a 
larger incentive to produce this socially valuable 
information—which would lead to materially higher levels of 
stock-price accuracy. 
Notably, such a broad prohibition would only apply to the 
trading of public companies’ stocks. Further, even for those 
stocks, the mandate would be limited to a prohibition on 
trading through sophisticated electronic off-exchange trading 
platforms. It would therefore not affect the ability of parties 
to negotiate agreements to buy and sell blocks of stock with 
each other. Additionally, policymakers could adopt this 
measure in whole or in part, with the degree of its impact on 
price accuracy turning on the breadth of the mandate 
adopted. Indeed, they could begin by experimenting with a 
cross-section of stocks, which is something that Congress and 
the SEC have recently shown an inclination to do in this 
general area.88 
Lastly, it is worth noting that Congress has granted the 
SEC broad powers to promulgate and revise stock-trading 
rules to develop and improve a national market system for 
the trading of exchange-listed equity securities.89 This 
rulemaking delegation could be read to allow the SEC to 
impose the exchange-trading mandate in the name of 
enhanced stock-price accuracy. As such, the SEC may be able 
to promulgate such a mandate—in whole or in part—without 
any additional congressional action. 
  
 
88 See, e.g., The Jumpstart Our Business Start-Ups Act § 106, 15 
U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(6) (2012) (encouraging the SEC to set up a study in 
which a sample of public firms experiment with different trading rules 
relating to the minimum allowable increment between quoted prices). 
89 See generally Securities Exchange Act § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 
(2012). 
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2. Materially Improving Stock-Price Accuracy via 
a Public-Firm Subsidy for Exchange Liquidity 
Provision 
Another example of a way in which lawmakers could 
change stock-market law to improve price accuracy would be 
by imposing a public-firm subsidy to support exchange 
liquidity provision. Such a subsidy could come in the form of 
a mandate that requires firms to make payments to the 
exchange liquidity providers that post the most competitive 
quotes in their stocks. These mandatory payments could be 
distributed as a per-share rebate each time one of the 
liquidity providers’ standing quotes executes against an 
incoming order. Suppose, for example, that two liquidity 
providers quote ask prices for 1,000 shares of the same stock. 
One posts a superior (lower) ask price of $44.11 per share, 
and the other posts an inferior (higher) ask price of $44.12 
per share. Suppose, too, that a trader submits a buy order 
that seeks to transact immediately against the best (lowest) 
ask prices in the market for 1,000 shares of that stock. In 
this example, then, the liquidity provider quoting the more 
competitive $44.11-per-share ask price would complete this 
transaction, but the liquidity provider offering to sell the 
shares at the $44.12 price would not. In this way, the 
proposed subsidy would reward those liquidity providers 
with the most competitive quotes—and thus encourage 
liquidity providers to offer the shares at the most competitive 
prices in order to capture the subsidy. In the end, this type of 
firm subsidy would achieve the same type of effect that the 
exchange-trading mandate would achieve. That is, it would 
incentivize exchange liquidity providers to post superior 
price quotes with less sensitive quote-adjustment triggers, 
which would in turn likely lead to larger profit opportunities 
for informed traders and therefore a higher level of stock-
price accuracy. 
With this perspective on a public-firm subsidy for 
exchange liquidity provision, one could view the exchange-
trading mandate as, effectively, a similar type of mandatory 
subsidy. Remember that exchange liquidity providers make 
up what they lose to informed traders by completing spread-
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earning transactions with uninformed ones.90  This fact gives 
rise to the inference that forcing the off-exchange trading 
that is now dominated by uninformed traders to go through 
exchanges would provide an uninformed-trader subsidy of 
exchange liquidity provision. It would do so because pushing 
these traders to exchanges would permit exchange liquidity 
providers to earn more revenue from supplying their services 
to uninformed traders. For these reasons, the exchange-
trading mandate can also be seen as a mandatory subsidy for 
exchange liquidity provision—albeit one in which the 
uninformed traders that currently transact through off-
exchange platforms would be providing the subsidy. 
However one views the exchange-trading mandate, one 
attractive attribute of the public-firm subsidy is clear: it 
leaves the current private ordering of the stock market in 
place. But despite the appeal of going with a straight-up firm 
subsidy that defers to that current industrial organization of 
the stock market, two caveats should be kept in mind. First, 
the contemplated subsidy effectively involves taxing the 
investors who currently own public-company stocks in order 
to help sophisticated banks, hedge funds, private equity 
funds, and actively managed mutual funds. Although many 
would argue that the three main areas of securities law do 
exactly this, and even though these market participants are 
thought to be integral to the production of information about 
firms’ prospects, such a new subsidy is likely to be unpopular 
as a matter of politics. Second, relative to the exchange-
trading mandate, it would presumably be tougher to argue 
that a public-firm subsidy falls under the congressional 
delegation that empowers the SEC to regulate the stock 
market. 
Without getting into further detail,91 this Part has shown 
that a central, yet little-noticed, set of stock-market rules 
 
90 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
91 Other changes to stock-market law would undoubtedly have similar 
results. For example, requiring off-exchange platforms to accept all 
investors may accomplish these same ends—and fall squarely within the 
SEC’s rulemaking authority. Such a change in the law too would have the 
benefit of allowing these platforms to continue to exist. However, it might 
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has significant theoretical implications for contemporary 
stock trading as well as stock-price accuracy and its main 
social benefits. In so doing, it has demonstrated that more 
than simply the conventional securities-law tools of 
disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading law can be used to 
materially increase stock-price accuracy. Instead, stock-
market law too can be deployed toward that end—for 
example, by mandating that all trading take place through 
exchanges or by imposing a public-firm subsidy for exchange 
liquidity provision. Yet this area of securities law has been 
omitted from the broad debate on how to best achieve one of 
the principal goals of the field: obtaining a socially optimal 
level of stock-price accuracy. Given this gap between the 
conventional approach to reaching this goal and what stock-
market law can likely do, Part V urges regulators to consider 
whether they can make accuracy-enhancing reforms to stock-
market law that would increase social welfare. 
V. EXAMINING WHETHER THIS NEW ACCURACY-
ENHANCING TOOL CAN BE USED TO IMPROVE 
SOCIAL WELFARE 
Regulators should consider whether accuracy-enhancing 
changes to stock-market law can be used to improve social 
welfare in one of two ways. First, they should examine 
whether such changes to stock-market law would enhance 
the current level of stock-price accuracy in a manner that 
would lead to net social benefits. Second, even if they 
determine that altering stock-market law in this way would 
not yield net social benefits, they should take steps to figure 
out whether those alterations in conjunction with reforms to 
securities law more generally would help society obtain the 
current level of stock-price accuracy at a lower cost than the 
 
effectively take away much of the appeal that these platforms now have. 
Without their ability to present liquidity providers with the pool of 
uninformed traders that they now present to them, liquidity providers 
would lack the incentive that they now have to provide their services on 
these platforms. In the end, the platforms may host little trading activity 
relative to the amount they now host. 
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one associated with the burdensome existing core of 
securities law. 
Section A urges regulators to consider the desirability of 
using stock-market law to increase the current level of stock-
price accuracy—and details some of the main social benefits 
and costs that they should consider in making that 
determination. Section B urges them to think about whether 
it would be socially desirable to direct the use of this new 
tool to replace some of the work now accomplished by 
disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws—and touches on 
the considerations that would dictate whether this tack 
would in fact provide a lower-cost way of arriving at the 
current level of stock-price accuracy. 
A. The Desirability of Using Stock-Market Law to 
Increase the Current Level of Stock-Price Accuracy 
Regulators should consider whether instituting reforms to 
stock-market law in order to increase the current level of 
stock-price accuracy would generate social benefits that 
exceed the social costs necessary to achieve them. The 
enormous task of evaluating the relative weights of all such 
benefits and costs is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nevertheless, this Section discusses some of the main 
benefits and costs associated with using at least the new 
accuracy-enhancing changes sketched out in this Article, 
thereby providing regulators with a basic cost-benefit 
framework for making that evaluation. 
1. The Main Social Benefits 
Using an exchange-trading mandate or a public-firm 
subsidy for exchange liquidity provision to increase the 
current level of stock-price accuracy would have at least two 
main social benefits. The first would be the improvement in 
corporate governance and capital allocation that would 
result from a higher level of stock-price accuracy.92 After all, 
both of these illustrative reforms to stock-market law would 
 
92 See generally supra Part II.B & Part IV.B.2. 
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lead to price quotes on exchanges that are superior and less 
sensitive to trading activity. And when these quotes change 
in this way, informed traders have more profit 
opportunities—meaning that the incentive for them (and 
those from whom they procure information) to produce 
information about firms’ prospects is higher. 
The second main social benefit of making accuracy-
enhancing changes to stock-market law would also relate to 
these better and less-reactive price quotes on exchanges. 
However, it would relate to how those price quotes affect 
something distinct from price-accuracy. Over 60% of all 
trading still takes place through exchanges. Despite the 
higher ratio of informed traders to uninformed ones at the 
heart of this Article, the overwhelming majority of that 
trading is still attributable to uninformed traders. These 
traders now face the same inferior prices and hair-trigger 
price-quote adjustment thresholds that informed traders now 
face at exchanges. If all trading instead took place through 
exchanges, or if exchange liquidity provision were 
subsidized, then these traders would share in the benefit of 
superior pricing and less sensitive quote-adjustment 
triggers. Facing these better and less sensitive prices, these 
traders would likely—at a minimum—engage in more 
voluntary transactions that are thought to be welfare-
increasing. Perhaps even more importantly, finding stock 
transactions to be less costly when facing these altered 
prices, these traders may increase the amount they are 
willing to pay in return for stocks—thereby decreasing firms’ 
costs associated with raising capital and increasing the 
economic benefits to which those lower costs lead.93 
Thus, the changes to stock-market law contemplated here 
would lead to at least two main sets of social benefits: those 
 
93 Notably, these changes would also aid the many noise traders that 
would undoubtedly trade via exchanges should either of these reforms be 
implemented. See supra note 27 (describing these traders). Although it is 
unlikely that policymakers would want to aid these irrational traders 
directly, it is worth noting that they are uninformed traders who generally 
lose to informed traders—and therefore provide those traders with larger 
profits.  
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related to more accurate stock prices, and those associated 
with better prices for the uninformed traders that now 
transact through exchanges. 
2. The Main Social Costs 
Altering stock-market law to improve the current level of 
stock-price accuracy would also impose notable social costs 
that regulators should consider in attempting to determine 
whether or not such alterations would result in net social 
benefits. The main costs of such alterations differ based on 
the form of the change. This Section provides a window into 
such costs by examining the main costs of the two 
illustrative changes to stock-market law discussed above. 
a. Main Costs of an Exchange-Trading 
Mandate  
Requiring that stock trading be generally conducted 
through exchanges would result in at least two main social 
costs. First, the mandate may eliminate important benefits 
that traders currently receive as a result of private 
competition and innovation among trading platforms. 
Relatively little is publicly known about how off-exchange 
platforms operate. Certainly, however, the many entities 
that run these trading platforms have produced innovation 
that benefits the many traders that have been attracted to 
them. At a minimum, this innovation results in socially 
valuable trades between buyers and sellers that may not 
otherwise occur. 
However, it is important to note that mandating that all 
trading generally occur on exchanges would not necessarily 
deprive society of these benefits. With this larger universe of 
traders completing its buying and selling through exchanges, 
exchanges will have greater reason to compete for the 
business of uninformed individual and institutional traders. 
Today, these trading platforms have less reason to innovate 
in this way because such a large portion of uninformed 
trading is occurring through off-exchange platforms. One 
would expect, though, that requiring trading to take place 
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via exchanges would give those more traditional platforms 
powerful new motivations to provide innovations that these 
traders will value. Therefore, the magnitude of this first cost 
is likely lower than it first appears. 
The second notable cost to which the exchange-trading 
mandate may lead relates specifically to the quality of prices 
received by the traders that currently transact through off-
exchange platforms. On the surface, off-exchange platforms 
appear to provide these traders with prices that are superior 
to those available at exchanges.94 If the law were changed to 
eliminate these platforms, then these traders would 
therefore—at least at first glance—not receive these prices 
that likely lead to more welfare-increasing transactions 
among uninformed traders as well as a lower cost of capital 
for firms. 
But, the value of the superior prices offered by off-
exchange platforms today is not as substantial as it might 
initially appear. Indeed, these platforms may not provide a 
large portion of the traders that transacts through them with 
any price-quality benefit whatsoever relative to a market 
where all trading took place on exchanges. At the threshold, 
the “price improvement” offered by a large portion of off-
exchange platforms is, at best, nominal.95 But more 
importantly, because a substantial portion of these platforms 
essentially matches the best (highest) bid quote prices and 
best (lowest) ask quote prices generated by liquidity 
providers on exchanges, the traders who currently transact 
through them may actually face better prices if all trading 
occurred instead through exchanges. 
Recall that exchange price quotes now reflect the higher 
ratio of informed traders to uninformed ones that results 
from the trading-platform access rules—and that this higher 
 
94 See supra Part III.B.2 (explaining that off-exchange platforms 
generally provide traders with the prices that are at least nominally better 
than the best ones quoted on exchanges nationwide). 
95 See id.; Concept Release, supra note 2 (“The [typical off-exchange 
platform that is focused on individual retail-level investors] immediately 
executes retail order[s] [at a price that is] slightly better than the best 
[quoted] price in the market (usually by .0001 [per share.])”). 
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ratio leads to inferior price quotes on exchanges.96 As such, 
off-exchange platforms may be charging a substantial 
portion of the traders that transact through them prices that 
reflect the higher ratio of informed traders to uninformed 
ones associated with the distinct exchange trading 
environment. These prices are therefore inferior to the ones 
that uninformed traders would receive through exchanges if 
exchanges had a lower ratio of informed traders to 
uninformed ones. And exchanges would have such a lower 
ratio in a market where all trading occurred through them. 
Thus, off-exchange platforms are now providing uninformed 
traders as a whole with less of a price-quality benefit than 
they appear to be providing at first glance—and are 
therefore supplying society with fewer of the benefits 
associated with increased price quality. 
Indeed, uninformed traders themselves might actually 
prefer that all trading be conducted on exchanges today. 
However, the large portion of them that is composed of 
individual, retail-level investors. Those investors are likely 
routed to off-exchange platforms by their agents (stock 
brokers) without their knowledge. The remainder of the 
uninformed traders that current transact off-exchange is 
made up of larger index funds and the like. It is unlikely that 
these market participants are able to work collectively in 
order to ensure that they all move their trading to 
exchanges—thereby removing the incentive for any one of 
them to move its trading to exchanges. After all, the superior 
exchange pricing anticipated here will only result if 
enormous amounts of off-exchange trading is moved to 
exchanges. 
Further, briefly looking even more deeply into the 
mechanics of exchange trading shows that the value of any 
superior pricing currently provided by off-exchange 
platforms may be larger than it first appears for a second 
reason: Even if all uninformed traders were forced to 
transact through exchanges, they would not always have to 
transact against exchange liquidity providers’ price quotes. 
 
96 See generally supra Part IV.A. 
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Instead, these traders will often be able to accomplish their 
trading goals through exchanges by purchasing at bid prices 
and selling at ask prices. And the former are generally lower 
than the market’s current assessment of the stock’s 
fundamental value, while the latter are generally higher 
than that assessment).97 
In contrast to informed traders, uninformed traders place 
a relatively low value on execution speed and certainty.98 By 
definition, these traders are not transacting based on some 
depreciating informational asset relating to a delta between 
current market prices and fundamental values that could 
change at any moment. Instead, before their transactions 
take place, as far as they know, stock prices during that next 
interval of time have a more or less 50-50 chance of 
increasing or decreasing.99 Accordingly, whether their orders 
to buy and sell pieces of their stock portfolios are executed in 
a fraction of a millisecond, an hour, or even a week is 
largely—before the transaction—irrelevant to these traders. 
By law, such patient traders are now able to complete 
their trading needs by providing liquidity services to other 
stock traders on exchanges. Any trader may access any 
exchange through any one of a long list of stock brokers that 
is a member of that exchange.100 And every exchange allows 
its members to post their clients’ bid and ask quotes on the 
exchange’s trading system. For these reasons, all traders can 
accomplish a portion of their trading needs over time by 
purchasing stocks by placing market bid quotes and selling 
them by placing market ask quotes. By purchasing at bid 
prices and selling at ask prices in this manner, these patient 
traders avoid the inferior prices associated with transacting 
immediately with certainty against other liquidity providers’ 
ask prices and bid prices. As a result, these traders can—and 
routinely do—meet some significant portion of their trading 
 
97 See supra Part III.A.3. 
98 See generally supra Part IV.A.1 (explaining the premium that 
informed traders place on the ability to transact quickly with certainty). 
99 For one of the seminal works on this concept, see generally Eugene 
F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965). 
100 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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needs by providing liquidity services to other traders. That 
is, they complete their trading needs by posting bid price 
quotes and ask price quotes against which other traders will 
transact.101 Thus, the social costs arising out of any inferior 
prices that uninformed traders face under an exchange-
trading mandate may be far smaller than they might 
initially appear for this second reason.102 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it may be helpful 
to take a step back from the nuanced mechanics of the 
contemporary stock market to recognize something more 
basic: any inferior prices imposed on uninformed traders by 
an exchange-trading mandate may very well be immaterial. 
This point becomes clear when viewing these inferior prices 
as giving rise to a spread cost.103  Like all traders, 
uninformed traders amortize their trading costs (including 
spread costs) over the lifetime of an investment. But, in 
contrast to most other traders, the typical investment 
horizon of an uninformed trader is long.104 And that 
sustained time span is relevant to any assessment of 
 
101 Purchasing and selling stocks via quotes rather than transacting 
immediately by paying liquidity providers’ quoted prices has its own risks, 
including the risk of losing to informed traders. It also presents the risk of 
non-execution as market prices move in the opposite direction of the best 
quoted price, thereby leaving the trader to transact at a worse price than if 
its order had simply been executed immediately against a price quote. 
Still, completing one’s trading needs by providing liquidity to other less 
patient market participants often results in obtaining superior prices. 
102 Interestingly, the portion of current off-exchange uninformed 
trading that would—in a world where all trading took place through 
exchanges—proceed through providing other traders with firm bid and ask 
quotes rather than transacting against liquidity-provider quotes would not 
help reduce the current exchange ratio of informed traders to uninformed 
ones. For this reason, even if all trading took place on exchanges, some 
degree of the issue for price accuracy identified here may still exist. 
103 See supra note 33. 
104 See supra Part III.A.1 (stating that informed traders enter and 
exit stock positions far more frequently than uninformed traders); supra 
Part III.A.2 (describing the longer-term investment window of the typical 
uninformed trader, including “buy and hold” investors that maintain 
ownership of stocks over sustained periods of time more easily measured 
in decades than milliseconds, seconds, days, or even weeks). 
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whether inferior exchange pricing would impose material 
costs on society. 
In today’s market the delta between bid and ask prices 
and current market valuations is generally on the order of a 
mere penny or two for most stocks105—meaning that the 
spread cost associated with the delta between bid prices and 
stock’s fundamental values and ask prices and those values 
is typically but a half cent or a cent. For example, if a long-
term uninformed trader purchases a stock at an exchange 
liquidity provider’s ask price of $44.11 per share when the 
current market valuation of the stock is $44.10 per share, 
that trader can be said to overpay by $0.01 per share as a 
result of having to transact against that ask quote. And 
twenty years later when that trader sells the stock, she 
would likely sell it in return for the price provided by an 
exchange liquidity provider’s bid quote that is similarly 
below the stock’s then-current value. These aspects of stock 
trading dictate that the investor will have paid a mere 0.02% 
spread cost in order to purchase the stock, and paid some 
similar tiny twenty years later in order to sell the stock. 
These transactions would thus give rise to a total bid-ask 
spread cost of approximately 0.04%—which is the average 
size of the bid-ask spread cost associated with buying and 
selling the stocks of large public companies today.106 So, the 
costs associated with any inferior pricing for those 
uninformed traders that currently transact off-exchange that 
resulted from moving their trading to exchanges may be of 
little social consequence in a world where uninformed 
traders invest over long periods of time and the difference 
between exchange liquidity providers’ quotes and current 
market values is but a penny or two for most stocks.  
 
105 See, e.g., CFA INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF: DARK POOLS, 
INTERNALIZATION, AND EQUITY MARKET QUALITY 5 (2012) (noting that in a 
cross-sectional sample of large-company, medium-company, and small-
company stocks, the median quoted bid-ask spread was, respectively, one 
cent (0.04% of the average large-company stock’s value), two cents (0.09% 
of the average medium-company stock’s value), and nine cents (0.83% of 
the average small-company stock’s value). 
106 See id. 
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b. Main Costs of a Public-Firm Subsidy for 
Exchange Liquidity Provision  
There are at least three key social costs associated with 
offering liquidity providers a subsidy funded through a fee on 
public companies. First, to the extent that public firms 
produce goods and services in competitive markets, we can 
expect this fee to increase these companies’ costs in a 
manner that leads them to increase the prices that they 
charge for those goods and services. In this way, the fees 
would impose a social cost in the form of lost opportunities 
for consumers to transact with these firms. 
Second, imposing a fee on publicly traded firms would, on 
the margin, dissuade some companies from publicly listing 
their shares altogether. The exact marginal effect would be 
unclear—particularly in light of the already-substantial 
costs associated with being a publicly traded company in the 
United States. But policymakers consider a public-firm 
subsidy for exchange liquidity provision should nevertheless 
examine whether imposing such a fee might meaningfully 
impair the ability of private firms to raise public capital. 
Those concerns deserve particular attention in light of the 
well-documented costs that result when companies are 
deterred from raising equity capital. 
Finally, to the extent that domestic exchanges impose 
these fees but foreign ones do not, some firms may be more 
inclined to list their shares only on the latter.107 While it is 
unclear whether this result would even be problematic from 
a social point of view, United States regulators would 
doubtless want to consider this effect when contemplating 
the imposition of a fee of this kind. 
  
 
107 See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES 
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (12th ed. 2013) (noting that “shortly 
after 2000, [the] migration of foreign issuers to the U.S. market largely 
halted” and that “[c]learly . . . foreign issuers began to find the costs of a 
U.S. listing [that resulted from legal changes] . . . to be dauntingly 
expensive.”). 
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B. The Desirability of Using Stock-Market Law to 
Obtain the Current Level of Stock-Price Accuracy 
After doing a cost-benefit analysis, regulators may very 
well come to the conclusion that using stock-market law to 
increase the current level of stock-price accuracy in one of 
the above ways or in yet some other way is socially 
undesirable. But regulators should still consider whether 
they can use accuracy-enhancing changes to stock-market 
law in a manner that improves social welfare in distinct way: 
by serving as an alternative, lower-cost means for obtaining 
the current level of stock-price accuracy. 
Improving the accuracy of public companies’ stock prices 
is perhaps the principal aim of the three main areas of 
securities regulation.108 However, these core areas of 
securities law that are so focused on improving stock-price 
accuracy impose well-documented costs on society. 
Mandatory-disclosure laws force firms to devote substantial 
resources toward providing the market with information that 
is necessary to produce more accurate stock prices.109 Laws 
prohibiting fraud require these businesses to expend 
substantial resources to ensure the truthfulness and 
integrity of their disclosures so that market participants can 
rely on them when determining stocks’ values. And laws that 
limit insider trading can be viewed as imposing law-
enforcement and compliance costs on society to protect the 
sophisticated outside informed traders that will best 
generate accurate market prices from being undercut and 
mislead by the trading of corporate insiders.110 
To the extent that these securities laws now impose 
burdens on society in order to bring about price-accuracy 
benefits, lawmakers should consider whether society could 
obtain a better cost-benefit ratio by using stock-market law 
in lieu of parts of those existing laws. More simply stated, 
they should examine whether securities law can produce 
more bang for its buck by using a novel approach in place of 
 
108 See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
109 See, e.g., Fox et al., supra note 5.  
110 See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 6. 
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some of the conventional ones: adopt accuracy-enhancing 
alterations to stock-market law like the ones set forth in this 
Article while also reducing some burdensome aspects of the 
core of securities law. 
As with the relative weights of the social costs and 
benefits outlined in the preceding Section, determining 
whether or not stock-market-law reforms would provide a 
lower-cost means for achieving the current level of stock-
price accuracy than the existing aspects of disclosure, fraud, 
and insider-trading law now aimed at that end is far beyond 
the scope of this work. However, those same costs and 
benefits of the exchange-trading mandate and the public-
firm subsidy discussed in that Section provide regulators 
with a basic framework for beginning to examine that 
complex and important issue. 
In sum, as a matter of theory, stock-market law can be 
used to enhance the accuracy of public firms’ stock prices—
and this Part has set forth a basic cost-benefit framework to 
help regulators determine whether using it to do so would 
increase the overall level of wealth generated by society. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For decades, securities law has been motivated by the 
view that accurate stock prices convey valuable social 
benefits relating to corporate governance and capital 
allocation, yet will be under-produced absent legal 
intervention into market forces. The effects of the well-
known securities laws that mandate firm disclosure and 
prohibit corporate fraud as well as insider trading on the 
accuracy of public companies’ stock prices and the amount of 
wealth generated by society have therefore been well-
studied. But the price-accuracy and welfare implications of 
another, long-overlooked area (stock-market law) have 
generally escaped the attention of those who have long 
praised the social benefits of more accurate stock prices. 
This Article has used well-established lessons from 
market-microstructure economics to theorize that the federal 
securities laws governing the market in which stocks are 
traded result in society producing a lower level of price 
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accuracy than it otherwise might—thereby failing to 
generate the benefits of improved corporate governance and 
capital allocation that it otherwise might. Because the 
trading-platform access rules mandate that all traders can 
buy and sell stocks through exchanges, but allow off-
exchange platforms to decide which traders can and cannot 
access their trading systems, off-exchange trading is 
dominated by uninformed traders. Consequently, exchange 
trading entails a far higher ratio of informed traders to 
uninformed ones than it otherwise might. In response to the 
concern that they will be unable to bring in enough revenue 
to cover the costs that informed traders impose on them, 
exchange liquidity providers alter their price quotes in two 
ways: by providing inferior price quotes and by lowering the 
trading-activity thresholds that trigger their adjustments of 
those quotes. Facing these altered quotes, informed 
traders—traders whose buying and selling activity is to a 
significant extent often relegated to exchanges—will have 
lower expected trading profits. For this reason, these market 
participants will invest less in the production (or 
procurement) of information about firms’ values—and 
inaccurate stock prices will remain uncorrected over 
sustained periods more often than they otherwise might. 
These theoretical implications of little-noticed trading rules 
thus led to the inference that regulators can change stock-
market law to improve stock-price accuracy—and that they 
therefore have a previously unidentified tool that they can 
use to make public companies’ stock prices more accurate. 
Building on these theories, this Article has argued that 
regulators should consider whether they can use this new 
securities-law tool to achieve what is perhaps the principal 
aim of modern securities regulation: obtaining a wealth-
maximizing level of stock-price accuracy. However, it has 
also cautioned that the pursuit of such reforms would be ill-
advised if the social benefits that would result from the 
higher level of price accuracy to which they would lead would 
fail to outweigh the social costs necessary to achieve them. 
Still, though, it has advised regulators to determine whether 
accuracy-enhancing changes to stock market law may 
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improve social welfare even if the marginal benefits of 
increases to the current level of price accuracy and more 
would not outweigh the marginal costs associated with those 
changes. After all, these policymakers may find that they can 
to achieve the current level of stock-price accuracy at a lower 
cost by relying more on stock-market law and less on the 
resource-intensive core of securities law that has long been 
deployed toward that end. 
These conclusions arising out of the analysis of long 
overlooked trading rules that dictate which of the two broad 
types of trading platforms is able to discriminate among 
traders and which is not thus reflect important 
considerations for policymakers. But just as importantly, the 
analysis provided in this Article has merely scratched the 
surface of what can be learned through market-
microstructure-driven examinations of the law governing the 
market in which stocks—and financial instruments more 
broadly—are traded. In particular, the Article has shown 
that this relatively unstudied area of law can have 
implications that go far beyond trading minutia to influence 
the degree to which key prices reflect public companies’ 
prospects in a manner that reverberates throughout society. 
 
